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Abstract	In	 the	 era	 of	 digital	 information	 we	 currently	 live	 in,	 information	 is	 much	easier	to	find	and	access.	One	of	the	most	common	paradigms	occurring	nowadays	is	technology	 evolving	 into	 smaller,	 more	 personal,	 specific-task	 devices	 that	 are	linked	 together	 via	 Internet,	 also	 known	 as	 Internet	 of	 Things.	 These	 devices	 are	generally	 storing	 the	 information	 on	 a	 cloud	where	 it	 can	 easier	 be	 processed	 to	enhance	 their	 functionality	with	 features	unavailable	without	much	computational	power.	 In	 order	 to	 make	 the	 whole	 system	 secure,	 it	 is	 important	 that	 both	 the	hardware	used	for	building	the	devices	and	the	software	that	runs	and	the	cloud	are	secure.	On	the	hardware	side,	the	cost	of	components	is	extremely	important	since	the	specific-task	devices	have	to	be	as	low-cost	as	possible,	achieving	security	in	the	smallest	 possible	 size	 is	 extremely	 important.	 This	 work	 proposes	 the	 smallest	hardware	 crypto	 core	 that	 is	 immune	 to	 side-channel	 attacks	 on	 the	market.	 The	core	 uses	 only	 75	 slices	 on	 a	 Spartan	 3	 FPGA.	 In	 software,	 achieving	 security	 is	extremely	hard	because	most	of	the	times	the	hardware	it	runs	on	can	be	attacked.	In	 this	 work	 I	 take	 a	 first	 step	 into	 proving	 that	 by	 simply	 measuring	 certain	hardware	performance	counters,	or	by	monitoring	certain	hardware	resources,	it	is	possible	 to	 accurately	 identify	 codes	during	 their	 execution.	Because	 of	 their	 high	criticality,	 this	 work	 uses	 crypto	 codes	 and	 tries	 to	 identify	 them	 using	 machine	learning	 techniques.	 In	 a	 simulated	 environment,	 an	 accuracy	 of	 over	 90%	 is	achieved	in	classifying	crypto	algorithms.	 	
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1. Introduction		The	digital	revolution’s	next	step	is	the	emergence	of	the	Internet	of	Things	and	Cloud	Computing.	On	the	one	hand,	the	market	of	embedded	systems	is	steadily	growing	 with	 estimated	 value	 to	 approach	 $200	 billion	 by	 2019	 (BBC	 Research	2014).	The	increasing	demand	for	embedded	systems	drives	the	increasing	need	for	reliability,	 privacy.	 Such	 systems	 are	 heavily	 deployed	 in	 smart	 metering,	automobiles,	 home	 automation,	 and	 health	 care	 to	 name	 a	 few.	 In	 all	 these	applications,	confidentiality	is	a	vital	component.	On	the	other	hand,	the	embedded	devices	are	closely	connected	to	the	Cloud	where	most	of	the	information	gathered	by	them	is	stored.	The	cloud	model	that	is	closely	related	to	the	Internet	of	Things	is	Software-as-a-Service	(SaaS)	which	offers	the	capability	of	using	and	paying	for	the	cloud	only	at	demand.	The	SaaS	market	is	expected	to	grow	to	$106B	in	2016,	and	by	 2018,	 more	 than	 half	 of	 the	 workloads	 will	 be	 provided	 by	 SaaS	 (Columbus	2015).		In	 the	 hardware	 world,	 the	 currently	 widely	 accepted	 standard	 for	confidentiality	 (AES)	 is	 too	expensive	 for	 these	highly	 constrained	devices.	Hence,	the	 cryptographic	 community	 proposed	 several	 lightweight	 alternatives	 including	SIMON.	SIMON	 is	a	 lightweight	encryption	algorithm	recently	proposed	by	NSA	as	an	alternative	to	AES	(Beaulieu,	et	al.	2013).	SIMON	was	specially	crafted	for	a	small	footprint	 in	 hardware	 designs.	 Sure	 enough,	 a	 bit-serialized	 implementation	 of	SIMON	currently	holds	the	smallest	footprint	of	any	encryption	algorithm	on	FPGAs	(Aysu,	Gulcan	and	Schaumont	2014).	However,	this	open	implementation	cannot	be	adapted	 in	 consumer	 products	 where	 the	 expected	 malicious	 user	 is	 typically	 in	control	 of	 the	 device.	 Such	 scenarios	 require	 protection	 against	 side-channel	analysis.	In	the	software	world,	unfortunately	it	has	been	proven	that	the	cloud	is	not	perfectly	secure.	Leakage	of	data	on	the	cloud	occurred	only	in	2015	from	intimate	information	 up	 to	 the	 Chinese	 attack	 that	 gained	 access	 on	 about	 4	 million	 US	federal	 workers	 (Tuliva	 2015).	 Another	 important	 data	 breach	 of	 2015	 targeted	health	care	 information	 from	the	UCLA	Health	System,	 leaking	 information	 for	4.5	million	patients	(Terhune	2015).	It	is	clear	that	storage	servers	are	not	immune	to	attacks	and	more	precise	investigations	related	to	security	needs	to	be	performed.	Side-channel	analysis	 (SCA)	 is	a	 class	of	 implementation	attacks	 that	 target	the	 physical	 implementation	 of	 a	 cryptosystem	 rather	 than	 its	 mathematical	structure.	 Here,	 the	 malicious	 user	 monitors	 a	 target	 device	 while	 operating	 to	extract	various	secret	 information	 through	unintended	side-channel	outputs.	Side-channel	 outputs	 of	 embedded	 systems	 include	 instantaneous	power	 consumption,	electromagnetic	radiation,	execution	time,	and	many	more.	Generally	speaking,	the	attacker	builds	a	 statistical	model	 that	 relates	 the	behavior	of	 the	 target	device	 to	the	secret	information	(the	key).	The	models	can	be	built	upon	power	consumption,	time	 it	 takes	 to	 run	 the	 program,	 cache	 information,	 etc.	 Then	 he	 projects	 the	collected	information	traces	on	this	model	searching	for	one	key	that	results	in	the	best	 match.	 Side-channel	 leakage	 has	 been	 proven	 to	 be	 extremely	 exploitable,	posing	a	real	threat	to	the	embedded	market.		
In	 hardware,	 protection	 against	 SCA	 comes	 in	 three	 categories:	 leakage	resiliency,	hiding	and	masking.	Leakage	resiliency	promotes	for	new	cryptographic	schemes	 that	 are	 re-designed	while	 including	 SCA	 in	 the	 threat	model.	 Typically,	these	 designs	 require	 updating	 the	 secret	 information	 after	 every	 encryption,	 to	limit	 the	 amount	 of	 information	 leakage	 that	 can	 be	 collected	 against	 any	 secret.	Hiding	 depends	 on	 minimizing	 the	 signal-to-noise	 ratio	 in	 the	 trace	 by	 forcing	 a	uniform/constant	 leakage.	One	 remarkable	 example	 is	 to	 include	 two	parts	 in	 the	design;	one	part	is	used	to	process	active	data	while	the	other	is	used	to	process	its	complementary.	Such	that,	the	system	power	consumption	is	kept	constant.	Masking	depends	 on	 splitting	 the	 input	 data	 into	 two	 (or	 more)	 shares	 using	 random	variable(s).	Each	share	is	to	be	processed	independently,	so	that	the	leakage	is	not	correlated	 to	 the	 actual	 secret.	 The	 results	 are	 combined	 at	 the	 very	 last	 step	 to	retrieve	the	original	output.	The	countermeasures	proposed	in	this	paper	follow	the	last	category.	Motivated	 by	 shrinking	 the	 cost	 of	 each	 embedded	 unit,	 a	 new	 research	target	was	set	to	design	the	smallest	 implementation	of	encryption	algorithm	with	sound	 countermeasure	 against	 SCA.	 During	 HOST’15,	 (Shahverdi,	 Taha	 and	Eisenbarth	 2015)	 proposed	 a	 SIMON	 core	 that	 is	 protected	 with	 a	 three-share	masking	scheme	using	only	87	slices	of	a	low-cost	Spartan-3	FPGA.	In	this	paper,	we	show	 that	 we	 can	 do	 a	 better	 job.	 We	 propose	 a	 SIMON	 encryption	 core	 that	requires	 a	 smaller	 area	 footprint	while	maintaining	 sound	 protection	 against	 SCA	attacks.	 Although	 threshold	 implementation	 with	 three	 shares	 is	 generally	recommended	 in	 hardware	 designs	 to	 prove	 security	 in	 presence	 of	 glitches,	 we	show	that	t-private	circuits	can	mitigate	the	problem	of	glitches	while	keeping	the	design	in	only	two-shares.	T-private	circuits	modifies	the	design	at	the	gate	level	to	include	randomness	in	the	structure	of	each	gate.	Our	core	requires	only	75	slices,	making	it	the	smallest	SCA	protected	encryption	core	on	FPGAs	to	date.	Protection	against	 SCA	 attacks	 is	 validated	 with	 practical	 setup	 using	 leakage	 quantification	tests.	 In	software,	side-channel	 leakages	have	been	proven	effective	in	identifying	malicious	 behavior.	 One	 approach	 that	 use	 this	 leakages	 for	 security	 purposes	 is	presented	in	(Clark,	et	al.	2013)	where	the	authors	recognize	malicious	software	by	running	machine	learning	algorithms	on	current	from	an	electrical	outlet	to	predict	which	 webpage	 has	 been	 accessed.	 (Pfaff,	 Hack	 and	 Hammer	 2015)	 show	 that	measuring	certain	hardware	performance	counters	and	running	through	it	using	the	same	 type	 of	 algorithms	 obtains	 very	 good	 results	 in	 predicting	whether	 running	code	attacks	via	Return-Oriented	Programming	or	not.	In	(Doychev,	et	al.	2015),	the	authors	introduced	an	automatic	tool	to	protect	against	cache	side	channels.	Cache	attacks	have	been	known	 to	be	very	powerful	 and	 the	authors	emphasize	on	how	much	information	can	be	obtained	just	by	monitoring	cache	lines.	Although	all	these	papers	present	 how	 side-channel	 leakage	 can	 identify	 certain	behavior,	 their	 high	accuracy	in	the	results	raise	the	idea	that	much	deeper	information	can	be	obtained	on	the	cloud.	In	this	work,	it	is	investigated	how	much	information	can	be	obtained	from	 side-channels	 by	 trying	 to	 distinguish	 whether	 running	 codes	 on	 a	 specific	platform	 can	 be	 correctly	 classified	with	 their	 sources.	 In	 this	work,	 crypto	 codes	were	chosen	to	be	distinguished	among	due	to	their	relevance	in	the	real	world	and	
our	tool	achieves	better	than	90%	accuracy	in	a	simulated	environment.	Moreover,	this	 research	 pushes	 the	 boundaries	 even	 further,	 by	 creating	 a	 more	 realistic	scenario	that	shows	to	be	capable	of	over	90%	accuracy	classifications.	This	 work	 treats	 both	 the	 hardware	 side	 and	 the	 software	 side	independently.	 The	 description	 of	 these	 contributions	 was	 split	 into	 two	 big	chapters:	 Small	 &	 Secure	 Simon,	 and	 Code	 Distinction	 via	 Side	 Channels.	 Each	 of	these	chapters	contains	their	own	section	of	Methodology	–	where	my	approach	on	tackling	 the	 problems	 is	 presented	 –	 and	 Implementation	 Details	 and	 Results	 –	where	more	detailed	information	on	the	implementation	is	given	and	how	well	the	implementation	performs.	The	Conclusion	 section	 sums	up	all	 the	key	 results	 and	insights	 obtained	 from	 the	 experiments	 for	 both	 projects.	 Finally,	 in	 the	 Future	Work	section	it	is	presented	what	are	the	next	steps	in	continuing	this	research.	 	
2. Small	&	Secure	Simon		
2.1	Background	
Simon	Cipher	SIMON	is	a	lightweight	cipher	introduced	by	the	NSA	(Beaulieu,	et	al.	2013).	It	was	designed	to	work	on	highly	constrained	hardware	platforms	where	the	heavy	mathematical	computations	required	by	typical	ciphers	(e.g.	matrix	multiplication	in	AES)	are	too	expensive.	SIMON	depends	on	a	Feistel	structure	that	consists	of	only	the	following	equations:	AND,	XOR	and	left	circular	shift.	There	are	many	versions	of	the	 cipher	 that	 accept	 plaintext	 sizes	 ranging	 from	 32	 to	 128	 bits	 and	 key	 sizes	ranging	form	64	to	256	bits	with	a	corresponding	number	of	rounds	ranging	from	32	rounds	to	72	rounds.	 In	this	paper,	we	focus	on	SIMON128/128,	which	accepts	128	bits	of	plaintext,	128	bits	of	key	and	runs	for	68	rounds.		In	 the	beginning,	 the	plaintext	 is	 split	 into	2	words	x	and	y.	A	 round	of	 the	encryption	is	calculated	in	the	following	way:		𝑅𝑖 𝑥,𝑦 =  𝑦 ⊕  𝑓 𝑥 ⊕  𝑘, 𝑥 ,	where	k	is	the	round	key	used	in	the	ith	round	and		𝑓(𝑥)  =  (𝑆(𝑥) & 𝑆!(𝑥))  ⊕  𝑆! (𝑥)	Here,	Sj	(x)	represents	left	circular	shift	of	x	by	j	bits.		Also,	the	initial	key	is	split	into	two	words	k0	and	k1,	which	are	used	in	the	first	 two	 rounds	 (note	 that	 only	 64	 bits	 of	 the	 key	 are	 used	 in	 each	 round).	Thereafter,		 𝑘!!! = 𝑐𝑖 ⊕  𝑘𝑖 ⊕  𝑆!! 𝑘!!! ⊕  𝑆!! 𝑘!!! 		,where	ci	is	a	round	constant.		
Bit-Serialized	Implementation	(Aysu,	 Gulcan	 and	 Schaumont	 2014)	 proposed	 a	 bit	 serialized	implementation	 of	 SIMON	 on	 FPGA,	 which,	 as	 they	 claim,	 is	 the	 smallest	implementation	of	any	crypto	engine	currently	in	use.	Another	interesting	result	of	their	work	 is	 that	on	 the	newer	 low-cost	Spartan-6	FPGAs,	 the	number	of	LUTs	 is	reduced	by	45%	compared	to	the	Spartan-3.	Hence,	we	believe	that	not	only	SIMON	is	a	very	good	lightweight	candidate	for	the	current	FPGAs	but	also	it	will	be	a	good	future	candidate	for	the	next	generations.		The	main	idea	behind	bit-serialized	implementation	is	to	compute	the	round-output	bit	by	bit	instead	of	processing	the	whole	word	at	the	same	time.	Note	that,	
not	all	 cryptosystems	would	benefit	much	 from	such	realization.	For	example,	bit-	serializing	 the	 matrix	 multiplication	 operation	 in	 AES	 is	 very	 complicated.	Essentially,	in	order	to	compute	one	bit	in	a	round,	we	need	to	process	so	many	bits	from	the	previous	rounds.	Fortunately,	this	is	not	the	case	for	SIMON	where	one	half	of	the	input	is	directly	copied	to	the	output	following	the	Feistel	structure	i.e.	only	one	bit	is	processed	at	a	time.	For	the	other	half,	only	four	bits	from	data-path	plus	one	key-bit	are	required	to	generate	the	output:			 𝑥 =  𝑦 ⊕  (𝑆(𝑥) & 𝑆!(𝑥))  ⊕  𝑆!(𝑥)  ⊕  𝑘(3)  The	 design	 proposed	 in	 (Aysu,	 Gulcan	 and	 Schaumont	 2014)	 consists	 of	 2	FIFOs,	 2	 Shift	 registers,	 and	 a	 Look-Up	 Table.	 The	 FIFOs	 are	 used	 to	 store	 that	internal	 state	 of	 the	 cipher.	 The	 shift	 registers	 are	 used	 to	 keep	 track	 of	 the	 four	data-path	bits	used	in	the	round	function.	The	Look-Up	Table	is	used	to	implement	the	round	function.	
T-private	Circuits	T-private	circuits	is	a	gate	level	countermeasure	that	was	original	proposed	by	 Ishai	 et	 al	 to	 protect	 against	 probing	 attacks	 (Ishai,	 Sahai	 and	Wagner	 2003).	Probing	 attack	 is	 a	 generalized	 side-channel	 attack	 where	 the	 adversary	 gains	access	to	a	number	of	t	probes	that	he	can	observe	during	the	whole	computation.	This	 attack	 includes	 all	 SCA	 flavors	 and	 also	 most	 invasive	 attacks	 where	 the	adversary	 can	use	micro-probes	 to	 directly	 capture	 various	 signals	 from	 the	 chip.	The	more	probes	the	attacker	has	access	to,	the	more	powerful	the	attack	is	and	also	the	more	complex	the	protection	needs	to	be.		The	 main	 idea	 behind	 t-private	 circuits	 is	 similar	 to	 masking	 where	 the	information	is	randomized	into	t	+	1	shares	so	that	the	attacker	cannot	gather	useful	information	even	after	recording	the	trace	of	t	probes.	Assuming	x	is	a	binary	input,	we	generate	t	random	bits	that	correspond	to	ri	with	(i	∈	[1	:	t]).	Then,	we	process	each	of	 the	 t	 values	 in	 addition	 to	 x	⊕	r1⊕	r2	⊕...	⊕	 rt.	At	 any	point	within	 the	cipher	 algorithm,	 modular	 adding	 all	 the	 shares	 retrieves	 the	 secret	 information.	Obviously,	only	with	all	the	t+1	values	x	can	be	retrieved.	The	difficulty	in	applying	typical	 masking	 schemes	 is	 that,	 the	 non-linear	 operations	 of	 any	 cipher	 require	special	modification	so	that	the	outputs	maintain	the	modular	addition	relationship.	Isahi	et	al.	took	a	different	approach	by	designing	a	special	set	of	gates	that	include	the	 required	 level	 of	 randomness	 (Ishai,	 Sahai	 and	Wagner	 2003).	 Once	 t-private	secure	gates	 replace	 the	original	design,	 the	 entire	 cipher	becomes	 secure	against	any	probing	attack	of	order	t.	To	achieve	this	goal,	 the	authors	proposed	NOT	and	AND	gates	in	addition	an	Encoder	and	a	Decoder.	The	Encoder	maps	every	regular	wire	 into	 t	+	1	wires	 that	 look	random	to	the	 attacker.	 The	 Decoder	 reverts	 the	 operation	 by	 mapping	 the	 t	 +	 1	 random-looking	wires	back	into	its	original	format.	The	NOT	and	the	AND	gates	are	enough	to	create	any	circuit.	These	two	gates	can	be	combined	to	create	all	the	other	gates	including	XOR,	OR	and	the	more	complex	ones.		A	 t-private	NOT	 gate	 operates	 on	 t	 +	 1	 bits	 input	 and	 generates	 t	 +	 1	 bits	output.	One	can	 think	of	 it	as	a	gate	with	a	1	bit	 input	and	a	1	bit	output	 that	can	
contain	 an	 encoder	 before	 the	 NOT	 gate	 and	 a	 decoder	 after	 the	 NOT	 gate.	 The	whole	system	needs	 to	behave	 just	as	a	regular	NOT	gate.	One	solution	 for	 it	 is	 to	invert	only	one	of	the	bits.	Creating	a	t-private	AND	gate	is	relatively	more	complex.	Similarly	 to	 the	NOT	gate,	 it	 needs	 to	 simulate	 a	 regular	 gate	 that	has	 an	encoder	before	 it	 and	a	decoder	after.	The	authors	proposed	a	 solution	 that	 requires	O(t2)	space	that	works	as	follows.	Assume	that	ai	and	bi	are	the	inputs	into	the	gate	and	ci	are	 the	outputs,	where	 (i	∈	 [1	 :	 t	+	1]).	Then	compute	 the	 intermediate	values	zi,j	such	that	for	1	≤	i<	j	≤	m	+	1	are	all	random	and	the	other	z	bits	are	computed	as:			 z!,! = (zi, j ⊕  aibj)  ⊕  ajbi  Using	this	information,	every	ci	can	be	calculated	as		𝑐! = 𝑎!𝑏!⊕ (𝑧!,!  𝑚𝑜𝑑!! !  2) More	optimized	t-private	circuits	have	been	proposed	by	Park	et	al.	in	(Park	and	Tyagi	2012)	and	(Park	and	Tyagi,	t-Private	Systems:	Unified	Private	Memories	and	Computation	 2014).	However,	 the	 authors	 didn’t	 prove	 side-channel	 resistance	 of	neither	of	 the	more	efficient	gates.	Moreover,	 the	authors	of	(Goddard,	LaJeunesse	and	 Eisenbarth	 2015)	 have	 demonstrated	 that	 one	 of	 the	 implementations	 leaks	information.	For	this	reason,	the	work	presented	in	this	paper	investigates	only	the	original	t-private	circuits	model.		
Leakage	Detection	Test	
The Welch t-test is a statistical test use to find how similar two populations 
are. It defines the variables t and v as follows:  
 
𝑡 = 𝑋! − 𝑋!𝑠!!𝑁! + 𝑠!!𝑁!                        𝑣 ≅  
𝑠!!𝑁!  + 𝑠!!𝑁!𝑠!!𝑣!𝑁!! + 𝑠!!𝑣!𝑁!! 
 
 ,where	 (𝑋1)	 is	 the	 sample	mean,	 s1,	 s2	is	 the	 sample	variance,	N1	is	 the	 sample	size,	𝑣1 = 𝑁1 − 1	and	𝑣2 = 𝑁2 − 1	are	the	degrees	of	freedom	for	each	variance.		In	(Moradi	and	Schneider	2015)	 it	 is	proposed	to	use	Welch	T-test	as	a	way	of	assessing	 leakage	exploitable	by	Side-Channel	Attacks.	The	methodology	proposed	is	to	run	the	engine	on	a	set	of	fixed	plaintexts	and	also	on	a	set	of	random	plaintexts	in	an	interleaved	way.	Then	take	the	two	resulting	sets	and	see	how	similar	they	are.	If	the	two	sets	look	fairly	similar	to	each	other,	then	the	cryptosystem	is	not	leaking	any	 information	 i.e.	 the	adversary	will	not	be	able	 to	 tell	 the	difference.	 If	 the	sets	
are	 very	 different	 from	 each	 other,	 then	 the	 system	 is	 believed	 to	 be	 unsecure	against	Side-Channel	Attacks.		
2.2.	Methodology	
Previous	work	Side-channel	properties	of	SIMON	block	cipher	were	 investigated	 in	(Bhasin	2014)	and	(Shanmugam	2014).	To	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	there	are	exclusively	two	side-channel	countermeasures	proposed	in	the	 literature.	First,	(Bhasin	2014)	proposed	 a	 low-cost	 realization	 of	 the	 masking	 scheme	 with	 only	 one	 data-path.	Here,	 the	 internal	 variables	 are	 partially	 unmasking	 just	 before	 the	 non-linear	operation.	Then,	the	input	mask	is	used	to	re-	randomize	the	internal	state	following	the	 Feistel	 structure.	 This	 scheme	 may	 practically	 work	 only	 if	 the	 demasking,	processing,	 and	 remasking	 are	 performed	within	 a	 single	 table	 look-up.	However,	the	 protection	 heavily	 depends	 on	 realization	 and	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 how	 to	map	 the	scheme	to	other	hardware	architectures.		(Shahverdi,	 Taha	 and	 Eisenbarth	 2015)	 proposed	 a	 three-share	 threshold	implementation,	 which	 is	 a	 provable	 method	 of	 applying	 masking	 in	 hardware	designs.	Threshold	implementation	requires	that	all	the	intermediate	variables	are	uniformly	distributed	(uniformity)	and	the	equation	required	to	process	any	share	must	be	missing	 at	 least	 one	 input	 (non-completeness).	Hence,	 the	 leakage	at	 any	instant	 looks	completely	 random	with	no	complete	 information	about	 the	 internal	secret.	The	proposed	implementation	requires	only	87	slices	and	it	is	secure	against	first	 order	 leakage.	 The	 independency	 of	 the	 shares	 allowed	 bit-serialized	implementation,	reason	why	the	overall	implementation	was	such	small.			
My	approach	The	 end	 goal	 of	 this	 work	 is	 to	 design	 and	 implement	 the	 smallest	 crypto	engine	secure	against	side-channel	attacks.	Since	there	have	been	such	good	results	with	 SIMON	 in	 (Shahverdi,	 Taha	 and	 Eisenbarth	 2015),	 creating	 a	 better	implementation	 of	 SIMON	 that	 uses	 only	 2	 shares	 seemed	 feasible.	 The	implementation	of	the	engine	builds	on	the	code	from	(Aysu,	Gulcan	and	Schaumont	2014),	which	is	publicly	available	on	the	Internet	on	top	of	which	I	re-implemented	several	 operations	 so	 that	 they	 are	 using	 t-private	 circuits.	 After	 all	 this	 is	 done,	thorough	investigation	of	the	security	of	the	implementation	needs	to	be	performed.		In	 order	 to	 investigate	 the	 security,	 I	 run	 one	 million	 encryptions	 and	measure	 power	 consumption.	 Out	 of	 these	 encryptions,	 half	 of	 them	 encrypt	 the	same	plaintext,	while	the	other	half	of	them	encrypt	random	plaintexts.	Then	I	run	the	Fixed	vs	Random	T-test	to	find	out	whether	there	is	any	correlation	between	the	two	 groups.	 If	 there	 is	 no	 correlation,	 it	 is	 fairly	 safe	 to	 assume	 that	 the	implementation	is	secure	against	first	order	leakage.	Otherwise,	the	implementation	is	leaky.		
2.3	Implementation	and	Results	
T-private	SIMON	core	The	proposed	engine	operates	on	two	shares,	hence	the	t-private	circuits	are	implemented	at	t	=	1.	Considering	p	to	be	the	plaintext	that	needs	to	be	encrypted,	the	engine	operates	on	two	shares:	𝑝𝑎 =  𝑝⊕ 𝑟1	and	𝑝𝑏 =  𝑟1.	Similarly,	the	key	k	is	split	into	two	shares	𝑘𝑎 = 𝑘⊕ 𝑟2	and	𝑘𝑏 = 𝑟2.	Our	design	assumes	that	splitting	the	inputs	 into	2-shares	 is	done	outside	 the	 core	 i.e.	 the	encoder	and	 the	decoder	are	placed	externally.	At	the	end	of	encryption,	the	engine	will	return	the	2-shares	that	represent	the	ciphertext,	not	the	ciphertext	itself.	My	 implementation	 of	 the	 bit-serialized	 SIMON	 builds	 on	 the	 open	 source	engine	 from	(Aysu,	Gulcan	and	Schaumont	2014).	As	 shown	 in	Figure	1,	 the	data-path	 has	 been	 duplicated,	 so	 that	 each	 copy	 process	 one	 share	 of	 the	 input	 data.	Each	share	uses	an	8-bit	Shift	Register	Up	(SRU),	an	8-bit	Shift	Register	Down	(SRD),	two	FIFO	queues	(a	54-bit	one	and	a	64-bit	one),	and	a	lookup	table.	The	two	FIFOs	are	used	in	order	to	store	the	bits	when	they	are	computed	and	also	to	retrieve	the	corresponding	bit	from	word	(y)	needed	for	computing	the	next	round.	The	SRU	and	SRD	are	used	in	order	to	store	the	corresponding	bits	of	the	left	circular	shift	and	to	save	the	state	of	the	new	computed	bit	of	the	next	round.	The	role	of	SRU	and	SRD	is	switched	on	each	round.	 In	 the	even	rounds,	 the	SRD	 is	used	 to	retrieve	 the	 three	bits	 from	the	circular	shift	needed	to	compute	the	next	bit,	and	the	SRU	is	used	to	store	the	newly	computed	bit.	In	the	odd	rounds,	they	switch	the	roles.				
	
Figure	1:	Structure	of	T-Private	SIMON	during	even	rounds.	During	the	odd	rounds,	interchange	the	
position	of	SRU	and	SRD	The	main	 round	 function	 of	 SIMON	 is	 implemented	 inside	 the	 LUTs	 (LUT1	and	 LUT2	 in	 Figure	 1).	 The	 main	 function	 can	 be	 easily	 converted	 into	 t-private	representation.	 However,	 implementing	 the	 AND	 gate	 between	 S(x)	 and	 S8(x)	requires	 a	 fresh	 source	 of	 randomness.	 Given	 that	𝑡 =  1,	 z1,2	 should	 be	 uniform	random,	while	z2,1	depends	on	z1,2	,	S	 (x)	and	S8(x).	Hence,	we	 include	a	dedicated	Random	Generator	 LFSR	on-board	 to	 generate	 z1,2,	while	 z2,1	can	 be	 realized	 as	 a	regular	 function.	Each	LUT	takes	all	 the	 inputs	needed	 from	the	SRU,	 the	SRD,	 the	
FIFO,	the	key	and	a	random	bit	and	computes	the	bit	value	of	the	next	round	to	be	stored	in	the	SRU	register	(or	SRD	in	the	odd	rounds).		One	 of	 the	 reasons	 why	 t-private	 is	 believed	 to	 not	 provide	 sufficient	protection	 against	 side	 channel	 analysis	 is	 its	 negligence	 of	 glitches,	 which	 may	result	 in	 random	 and	 partial	 results	 of	 the	 equations	 given	 in	 (Ishai,	 Sahai	 and	Wagner	 2003)	 to	 leak	 in	 the	 circuit,	 hence	 resulting	 in	 exploitable	 side	 channel	leakage.	Our	design	minimizes	the	effect	of	glitches	by	having	only	a	very	low	depth	in	 our	 combinational	 logic,	 typically	 just	 one	 gate.	 That	 is,	 bit-serialized	implementation	 of	 lightweight	 ciphers	 such	 as	 SIMON,	 which	 have	 a	 very	 low	algebraic	 complexity	 per	 round,	 avoids	 many	 of	 the	 common	 problems	 found	 in	making	side	channel	resistant	designs	work.	This	is	why	we	expect	to	avoid	leakage	that	was	 found	 in	 the	 implementation	of	 a	 present	 s-box	 in	 (Goddard,	 LaJeunesse	and	Eisenbarth	2015).			
Core	Implementation	We	build	the	engine	on	a	Spartan3	xc3s50	using	Xilinx	ISE	14.7.	We	tell	the	tools	to	optimize	for	area	and	to	keep	the	hierarchy	of	the	implementation	in	order	to	obtain	 the	most	efficient	 implementation	 that	does	not	make	any	optimizations	that	 induce	 leakage.	 A	 detailed	 table	 that	 summarizes	 the	 size	 of	 each	 of	 the	components	can	be	 found	 in	Table	 I.	Key	Shares	1	and	2,	Plaintext	Shares	1	and	2	contain	the	logic	that	handles	the	bit-serialization	for	both	the	plaintext	and	the	key.	The	 reason	 why	 the	 key	 is	 different	 is	 because	 one	 of	 the	 shares	 contains	 the	intelligence	 of	 the	 key	 expansion	 while	 the	 other	 one	 has	 nothing	 to	 compute	because	 it	 is	 random.	 The	 LFSR	 that	 generates	 the	 random	 bits	 used	 when	implementing	the	AND	gate.	Look-up	Table	Logic	implements	the	logic	required	to	compute	 the	 bits	 of	 a	 next	 round	 (as	 presented	 in	 Fig.	 1).	 The	 additional	 logic	represents	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 engine	 that	 is	 not	 strictly	 related	 to	 the	 t-private	circuits.	 It	deals	with	deciding	how	to	change	states	 such	 that	 information	can	 be	 introduced	 into	 the	 shares,	 how	 to	 tell	 the	 outside	 that	 the	 encryption	finished,	 etc.	However,	when	 synthesizing	 the	whole	 engine,	 the	 tools	 produced	 a	result	that	is	62	FFs	and	153	LUTs	which	means	that	they	managed	to	optimize	for	less	area.			
Table	1:	Implementation	Size	of	T-private	Simon	Part	 Size	Random	Generator	LFSR	 3	FFs,	4	LUTs	Key	share	1	 15	FFs,	47	LUTs	Key	share	2	 8	FFs,	16	LUTs	Plaintext	Share	1	 9	FFs,	9	LUTs	Plaintext	Share	2	 9FFs,	9	LUTs	Look-up	Table	Logic	 6	LUTs	Additional	Logic	 19	FFs,	47	LUTs	Total	 63	FFs,	154	LUTs		
Table	2:	Implementation	Size	of	Several	Ciphers	Ciphers	 Size	Unprotected	Cores:	 	AES	Present	Speck	Simon	
264	Slices	117	Slices	43	Slices	36	Slices	Protected	Cores:	 	3-Shares	Speck	3-Shares	Simon	 99	Slices	87	Slices	Our	T-Private	Simon	 75	Slices			 The	results	we	obtained	are	shown	in	comparison	to	other	implementations	in	Table	II.		The	 proposed	 protected	 encryption	 core	 is	 smaller	 than	 the	 currently	smallest	 unprotected	AES	 and	 PRESENT	 encryption	 cores,	 which	 require	 264	 and	117	slices	respectively	(Good	and	Benaissa	2005),	(Yalla	and	Kaps	2009).	While	all	the	protected	 cores	 in	Table	 II	 are	 secure	 against	 first	 order	 side-channel	 attacks,	our	core	is	the	smallest.		It	 is	 important	 to	mention	 here	 that	 slices	 are	 not	 a	 very	 good	metric	 for	measuring	the	size	of	a	design.	It	was	mentioned	in	(Shahverdi,	Taha	and	Eisenbarth	2015)	 that	 the	 authors	 used	 Plan	 Ahead	 in	 order	 to	 optimize	 the	 area	 used.	However,	 in	 real	 world	 there	 is	 no	 reason	 to	 do	 this	 since	 it	 would	 make	 the	implementation	 slower	 and	 it	would	 not	 provide	 any	 additional	 hardware	 to	 use.	Just	 as	 a	 comparison,	 using	 the	 information	 that	 a	 Spartan3	 slice	 contains	2	LUTs	and	2	FFs,	it	is	easy	to	compute	that	our	implementation	would	need	no	more	than	𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑙 !"! , 𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑙 !"#!  =  77 .	 77	 slices	 is	 only	 slightly	 larger	 than	 twice	 the	number	of	slices	used	in	the	unprotected	implementation.			
Practical	Setup	and	Results	The	setup	used	for	testing	our	engine	consists	of	a	SASEBO-GII	on	which	the	hardware	 is	 implemented,	 a	 Tektronix	 DPO-5104	 oscilloscope	 and	 a	 ZFL-1000LN	amplifier	that	collect	traces	of	high	resolution.	For	all	the	encryptions,	we	took	the	measurements	of	a	record	length	of	10,000	samples	and	a	sample	rate	of	100MS/s.		We	 examine	 leakage	 using	 the	 Fixed	 versus	 Random	 (FvR)	 experiment	proposed	 in	 (Moradi	 and	 Schneider	 2015).	 The	 Fixed	 and	 Random	 traces	 are	computed	in	random	order,	which	means	that	the	two	sets	do	not	necessarily	have	the	 same	number	 of	 traces.	 Following	Welch’s	 t-test	 described	 above,	 a	 value	 of	 t	above	4.5	shows	leakage.		In	the	first	experiment,	the	mask	is	fixed	to	zero,	i.e.	𝑝𝑎 =  𝑝⊕  0,𝑝𝑏 = 0 and	𝑘𝑎 = 𝑘⊕ 0 and	𝑘𝑏 = 0.	Hence	the	design	is	unprotected	and	expected	to	leak.	This	is	 done	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 the	 test.	 The	 result	 of	 analyzing	 50,000	observations	under	this	setup	is	shown	in	Figure	2.	Hence	the	design	features	a	very	
strong	 leakage	 if	masking	 is	 turned	off,	 also	 showing	 that	 the	 test	methodology	 is	sensitive.	
	
Figure	2:	Insecure	Implementation	In	the	second	experiment,	the	implementation	is	used	as	intended,	with	fully	randomized	masks.	The	number	of	observations	is	increased	to	a	total	of	1,000,000.	As	seen	in	Figure	3	the	design	shows	no	first-order	leakage.		
	
Figure	3:	Secure	Implementation		
3. Code	Distinction	via	Side	Channels	
3.1 		Background	
Machine	Learning	Machine	learning	is	a	field	of	computer	science	composed	of	algorithms	that	generally	 find	 patterns	 in	 data	 that	 can	 be	 used	 to	make	 future	 predictions.	 Easy	problems	are	generally	solved	by	particular	algorithms,	 i.e.	different	problems	are	solved	 by	 different	 algorithms.	 However,	 for	 hard	 problems	 with	 much	 noise,	particular	 algorithms	 are	 too	 hard	 to	 design.	 Machine	 learning	 provides	 a	 set	 of	models	 that	 can	be	 trained	 for	any	 type	of	problems.	With	more	data	and	 time	 to	train	on,	the	models	predict	future	results	more	accurately.	In	 machine	 learning,	 there	 are	 generally	 2	 steps:	 training	 and	 testing.	 In	training,	 the	 algorithm	uses	 the	data	 given	 in	order	 to	 create	 a	model	 that	 can	be	used	to	make	predictions.	Testing	is	used	to	evaluate	the	model	created	in	training.	The	evaluation	 is	done	by	 taking	 the	model	obtained	and	 running	 it	 against	more	known	data.	
Algorithms	Generally,	 the	 machine	 learning	 algorithms	 can	 be	 classified	 into	 three	categories:	 Supervised	 Learning,	 Unsupervised	 Learning	 and	 Reinforcement	Learning.	Most	of	them	are	differentiated	by	what	the	inputs	are	and	what	outputs	are	 we	 expected	 to	 have.	 Learning	 from	 data	 can	 also	 be	 done	 via	 probabilistic	inference	in	the	form	of	Bays	Nets	and	Naïve	Bayes.	In	Supervised	Learning,	the	biggest	characteristic	 is	the	fact	that	along	with	the	inputs,	the	data	learns	using	the	right	outputs.	It	is	called	supervised	because	the	correctly	 classified	 outputs	 come	 from	 a	 ”supervisor”	 that	 knows	 what	 the	 right	answers	are	for	all	the	inputs	given.	The	supervisor	can	be	anyone	or	anything	and	the	easiest	way	to	represent	it	is	by	having	one	extra	field	in	your	data	points	that	represents	 the	 correct	 classification.	 In	 other	 words,	 a	 supervised	 learning	algorithm	tries	to	look	at	the	inputs	and	the	outputs	and	try	to	find	a	rule	in	the	form	of	a	mapping	between	any	input	and	an	output.	In	Unsupervised	Learning,	the	data	comes	only	in	forms	of	inputs	and	there	is	no	 supervisor	 to	 say	 whether	 a	 data	 point	 belongs	 to	 a	 category	 or	 other.	 The	algorithm	needs	 to	 figure	out	all	by	 itself	what	hidden	patterns	are	 in	 the	data	by	performing	operations	such	as	clustering	or	regression.	Reinforcement	learning	involves	a	dynamic	environment	in	which	the	agent	must	 perform	actions	 towards	 a	 goal.	 They	 usually	 are	 broken	up	 into	 two	parts:	exploration	and	exploitation.	Exploration	runs	in	unknown	territory	trying	to	learn	new	rules	while	exploitation	uses	the	knowledge	gathered.		In	 this	 work,	 the	 data	 is	 gathered	 by	 measuring	 cache	 utilization	 at	 an	algorithm	runtime	in	a	simulated	environment,	reason	why	it	is	always	known	what	program	 corresponds	 to	 which	 measurements.	 Therefore,	 supervised	 learning	makes	most	 sense	 out	 of	 all	 techniques	mentioned	 above.	More	particular,	 in	 this	
work,	 I	 investigated	 how	 Decision	 Trees,	 Support	 Vector	 Machines,	 Neural	Networks,	Naïve	Bayes,	Bayes	Nets	behave	in	program	recognition.		
Decision	Trees	Decision	Trees	are	perhaps	the	simplest	models	that	can	be	created	based	on	the	data	given.	The	way	they	work	is	to	create	a	tree	structure	in	which	nodes	are	represented	as	a	dimension	and	edges	as	the	actions	possible	for	those	edges.	Figure	4	 shows	 an	 example	 of	 a	 decision	 tree	 that	 could	 be	 the	 result	 after	 the	 training	stage	where	the	attributes/dimensions	of	the	input	data	are:	X1	which	is	an	integer	input,	X2	which	is	a	Boolean	input,	X3	which	can	take	either	value	a	or	value	b,	and	Y	which	is	the	output	having	2	answers.				
	
Figure	4:	Decision	Tree	Example			From	now	on,	when	predicting	any	future	events,	we	traverse	the	tree	from	the	top	towards	the	bottom.	We	look	at	the	input	(in	a	general	form)		𝐼 = 𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥!,… 𝑥! ,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑥! ∈ 𝑋! 		Now	 look	 at	 the	 first	 node	 in	 the	 tree	 and	 evaluate	 its	 value	 compared	 to	 its	branches	and	take	the	corresponding	branch	that	fits	the	input	(for	example,	in	the	example	 tree	 if	 x1=20,	 then	 the	 first	 branch	will	 be	 taken).	 Then	 look	 at	 the	 next	node	and	perform	the	same	operation	until	an	end	node	that	contains	the	answer	is	reached	(e.g.	in	the	tree	above,	after	picking	x1	<	30,	if	x2	=	false,	then	an	end	node	would	be	reached	and	answer	2	is	predicted).	In	order	to	create	the	tree,	we	use	the	information	obtained	from	the	supervisor.	The	data	points	during	the	training	stage	look	the	following	way:		 𝐷 = 𝑥!, 𝑥!,… , 𝑥!,𝑦 ,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑥! ∈ 𝑋!  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌		Here	xi	correspond	to	the	inputs	of	the	point	and	y	is	the	correct	classification	of	those	 inputs	 given	 by	 the	 supervisor.	 Now	 look	 at	 all	 the	 data	 and	 choose	 the	attribute	 that	 gives	 most	 information	 in	 the	 dataset.	 There	 are	 several	 different	
algorithms	that	are	being	used	in	order	to	decide	which	attribute	is	best	at	a	certain	stage,	but	in	general	they	are	based	on	entropy.	A	precise	mathematical	notation	of	entropy	is:		 𝐻 𝑋 =  − 𝑃 𝑥! log! 𝑃 𝑥!!!!! ,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑏 𝑖𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑎 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒		Higher	entropy	means	that	the	data	is	more	random	and	smaller	entropy	means	that	 the	data	 is	 likely	 to	 have	 some	patterns	 in	 it.	 Generally,	 anytime	 an	 attribute	needs	to	be	chosen	as	a	node,	smaller	entropy	is	preferable	because	they	give	more	information	and	also	because	they	are	likely	to	keep	the	tree	smaller.	A	smaller	tree	is	favorable	because	after	it	is	created,	it	is	faster	to	traverse.	To	give	an	example,	if	in	the	dataset	there	are	250	answer1	and	12	answer2	corresponding	to	variable	X1	vs.	131	answer1	and	131	answer2	corresponding	to	variable	X2,	most	of	the	times	variable	X1	is	better	to	be	chosen	as	the	next	node	of	the	tree.	Using	decision	tree	as	one	of	the	classifier	algorithms	is	encouraged	because	the	nature	of	the	data	obtained	is	very	balanced.	A	big	pitfall	 in	using	decision	trees	is	the	fact	that	they	tend	to	skew	the	answers	towards	predicting	instances	that	occur	more	 in	 the	 dataset.	 However,	 in	 this	 program	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 data	 is	 very	balanced	 because	 the	 simulations	 can	 be	 made	 to	 measure	 the	 same	 amount	 of	information	 for	 any	 program,	 i.e.	 it	 is	 easy	 to	 perform	 the	 same	 number	 of	measurements	 for	 each	 algorithms	 in	 which	 all	 measurements	 have	 the	 same	format.	In	this	particular	case,	decision	trees	may	behave	well	and	not	skew	the	data	towards	 a	 certain	 result.	 They	 are	 also	 easy	 to	 run	 and	 offer	 a	 good	 visual	perspective	into	the	nature	of	the	data.		
		 	
Artificial	Neural	Networks	Artificial	Neural	Networks	(ANN)	are	 inspired	 from	the	human	brain	 in	 the	sense	that	it	tries	to	mathematically	model	a	neuron	and	link	it	to	others	of	its	kind.	A	simplified	mathematical	representation	of	a	neuron	can	be	seen	in	Figure	5.		
	
Figure	5:	Mathematical	Model	for	a	Neuron	The	neuron	is	composed	by	a	series	of	inputs,	an	activation	function	and	an	output.	 The	 weighted	 inputs	 are	 nothing	 more	 than	 outputs	 from	 other	 similar	nodes	 (or	 input	nodes	 that	will	be	explained	 later),	where	each	of	 the	 input	has	a	weight	associated	with	it.			 𝑓 𝑖𝑛! =  𝑔( 𝑤! ∗ 𝑎!)!!!!        [1]		 The	 activation	 function	 “f”	 presented	 in	 equation	 [1]	 maps	 the	 sum	 of	 all	inputs	multiplied	by	their	weight	into	an	output	via	function	“g”(which	is	generally	a	hard	threshold	or	something	else	that	returns	values	 in	a	certain	range	desired	by	the	network).	The	output	is	unique,	which	means	that	the	neuron	can	fire	only	one	value.	 Even	 if	 this	 neuron	node’s	 output	 is	 connected	 to	many	 other	 neurons,	 the	inputs	coming	from	it	will	all	be	the	same.		 A	 neural	 network	 is	 generally	 a	 Direct	 Acyclic	 Graph	 (DAG)	 that	 has	 input	nodes	and	neuron	nodes.	Input	nodes	are	directly	mapped	to	the	inputs	of	the	data	points,	while	the	neuron	nodes	are	generally	organized	in	layers.	Only	the	last	layer	is	visible,	i.e.	it	returns	something	that	can	be	observed	by	an	outside	party.	Besides	the	last	layer,	all	the	other	ones	are	called	hidden	layers	that	only	contribute	to	the	end	result.	Generally,	the	more	hidden	layers	a	network	has,	the	more	complicated	the	models	it	can	figure	out.	An	example	of	a	neural	network	is	shown	in	Figure	6.	It	shows	how	the	input	layer	has	no	inputs	since	it	corresponds	with	the	data	points.	Then	all	the	other	nodes	are	neurons	as	the	one	presented	in	Figure	5.	This	way,	all	inputs	can	be	forward	propagated	through	the	network	until	an	output	is	obtained.	
	
Figure	6:	Artificial	Neural	Network		 In	the	training	stage	of	the	algorithm,	the	network	basically	only	changes	the	weights	 of	 the	 edges	 so	 that	 it	 fits	 the	 training	 dataset	 better.	 The	 way	 this	 is	achieved	 is	 by	 first	 initializing	 all	 the	weights	with	 some	values,	 then	while	 going	data	point	by	data	point,	adjust	the	weights	 in	case	they	are	not	giving	the	correct	result.			 Although	Artificial	Neural	Networks	lost	popularity	due	to	their	complicated	nature	compared	to	other	models	such	as	Support	Vector	Machines,	they	became	a	hot	topic	again	during	the	development	of	Deep	Mind	where	it	serves	as	basic	data-structure.	The	article	(BBC	News	2016)	presents	that	Google’s	Deep	Mind	Go	player	AlphaGo	 beat	 the	 Go	world	 champion.	 Although	 not	 very	 popular	 on	 the	 topic	 of	program	recognition,	 I	decided	 to	use	ANN	because	 they	still	 represent	one	of	 the	most	important	algorithms.	
Support	Vector	Machines	Support	Vector	Machine	(SVM)	is	probably	one	of	the	most	popular	machine	learning	 algorithms	 at	 the	 moment.	 It	 works	 by	 creating	 a	 so-called	 maximum	margin	 separator,	 a	 hyper	 plane	 that	 separates	 a	 classification	 from	 others.	 The	most	important	property	of	this	separator	is	that	the	math	behind	SVM	guarantees	a	maximum	 distance	 between	 the	 separator	 and	 the	 two	 groups.	 The	 maximum	distance	 property	 makes	 SVM	 so	 powerful	 because	 it	 is	 always	 giving	 the	 best	separation/classification	 for	 the	 training	 set	 (unlike	ANN	 that	 train	only	up	 to	 the	point	where	the	network	correctly	represents	the	training	set	and	not	really	trying	to	create	the	best	model).	Although	 a	 hyper	 plane	 separator	may	 seem	 very	 restrictive,	 compared	 to	separators	that	multilayer	artificial	neural	networks	can	achieve,	SVMs	have	a	trick	
called	 the	 “Kernel	 trick”	 that	 offers	 much	 more	 flexibility	 in	 the	 shape	 of	 the	separator.	What	the	Kernel	trick	is	doing	is	adding	more	dimensions	to	the	data	by	using	 several	 Kernel	 functions.	 Then	 straight	 separator	 in	 the	 more	 dimensions	could	 be	 translated	 into	 complex	 shapes	 in	 fewer	 dimensions.	 One	 example	 that	illustrates	 how	 powerful	 this	 algorithm	 is	 compared	 to	 others	 can	 be	 seen	 in	(Kaensar	2013)	where	the	study	shows	that	SVMs	are	superior	to	ANN	and	k-NN	in	recognizing	digits	with	the	trade-off	that	they	are	the	slowest.	During	 training,	 the	 dataset	 is	 evaluated	mathematically	 in	 order	 to	 create	the	separator.	Once	 the	separator	 is	created	use	 the	model	by	checking	whether	a	data	point	lies	on	one	side	of	the	separator	or	the	other	and	classify	it	accordingly.	I	 decided	 to	 use	 SVM	 due	 to	 the	 their	 popularity	 in	 the	 field	 of	 program	detection	presented	in	(Pfaff,	Hack	and	Hammer	2015)	and	(Clark,	et	al.	2013).	Since	the	problems	are	similar,	it	is	expected	that	SVM	would	behave	well	on	the	current	dataset			
Probabilistic	Approach	Although	 not	 really	 machine	 learning	 algorithms,	 probabilistic	 models	sometimes	offer	good	inference	models.	The	probabilistic	approach	does	not	create	a	 fixed	data	structure	 that	 is	used	 for	 future	predictions,	but	rather	creates	a	data	structure	that	gives	results	based	on	certain	probabilities.	In	this	case,	the	training	set	 is	 used	 to	 update	 probabilities	 that	 will	 be	 used	 for	 inference.	 The	 two	probabilistic	models	that	are	used	in	this	paper	are	Naïve	Bayes	and	Bayes	Nets.	Naïve	 Bayes	 make	 an	 oversimplified	 assumption	 that	 all	 the	parameters/events	are	 independent.	Although	not	true	 in	reality,	many	times	they	turn	 out	 to	 give	 good	 results.	 It	 answers	 the	 query	 by	 using	 Bayes	 Equation	considering	 all	 events	 independent	 in	 the	 following	way:	 try	 each	 possible	 query	value	along	with	all	the	other	data	values	and	choose	the	one	that	gives	the	highest	probability.	Mathematically,	it	is	represented	the	following	way:	𝑦 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑝 𝐶! 𝑝 𝑥! 𝐶!!!!!            [2]		In	 equation	 [2],	 Ck	 represents	 each	 possible	 result	 of	 a	 query,	 and	 xi	represents	 each	 dimension	 corresponding	 to	 the	 point	 in	 the	 condition	 when	 Ck	occurs.	Bayesian	 Networks	 are	 slightly	 more	 complicated.	 They	 also	 build	 from	Bayes	 Theorem,	 but	 instead	 of	 assuming	 independence,	 it	 first	 needs	 to	 create	 a	Directed	 Acyclic	 Graph	 first	 that	 represents	 the	 dependencies	 between	 the	dimensions.	 Then	 it	 uses	 these	 dependencies	 to	 create	 a	more	 accurate	 inference	model.	 There	 are	 several	 models	 of	 inference	 but	 the	 most	 precise	 one	 (Exact	Inference)	 is	 an	 NP	 complete	 problem,	 reason	 why	 it	 is	 not	 viable	 for	 any	 big	dataset.	 Training	 a	 Bayesian	 Network	 is	 an	 easy	 problem	 when	 the	 structure	 is	known,	but	 it	becomes	a	much	harder	problem	when	the	structure	is	unknown.	In	
the	 problem	 that	 I	 am	 tackling	 in	 this	 project	 the	 structure	 is	 unknown,	 which	means	that	the	algorithm	I	use	needs	to	predict	the	dependencies	as	well.	I	 decided	 to	 test	 the	 probabilistic	 approach	because	 it	 is	 different	 than	 the	most	commonly	used	machine-learning	algorithms	in	the	field.	I	believe	that	it	may	give	some	insight	into	whether	such	approaches	are	viable	for	program	recognition	or	not.		
Testing	As	mentioned	 in	 the	beginning,	 there	 is	 always	a	big	 trade-off	between	 the	amount	of	data	you	train	the	model	on	and	the	amount	of	data	you	test	your	model	on.	Ideally	you	would	want	to	use	100%	of	the	data	for	both	training	and	testing,	but	that	is	impossible.	However,	it	is	possible	to	use	the	whole	dataset	for	both	training	and	testing	with	the	trade-off	that	no	data	point	can	be	used	for	both	of	them.	The	algorithm	 I	use	 in	 this	paper	 to	 split	 the	 training	and	 testing	 is	 called	k-fold	cross	validation.	K-fold	cross	validation	splits	 the	data	 into	k	windows.	Then	one	window	 is	used	 for	 testing	while	 the	 rest	 of	 k-1	 are	 used	 for	 training.	 The	machine-learning	algorithm	runs	k	times	so	that	each	window	is	used	once	for	testing	and	k-1	times	for	training.	At	the	end,	the	results	are	combined	to	give	a	unified	evaluation	of	the	algorithm	used.	
	
Program	Recognition	using	Machine	Learning	The	research	in	the	field	of	program	recognition	was	focused	mostly	around	certain	 topics.	 One	 of	 the	most	 impactful	 topics	 is	 related	 to	malware.	 (Fu,	 et	 al.	2013)	 presents	 a	 study	 on	 how	 Power	 Side	 Channels	 can	 be	 used	 to	 identify	malware	 that	 targets	medical	 data.	 	 They	 are	monitoring	 the	 power	 outlet	 over	 a	time	window	and	process	several	statistical	information	related	to	it	(such	as	mean,	variance,	 IQR,	 etc).	 Then	 they	 feed	 this	 information	 into	 some	 machine	 learning	algorithms	 that	were	 trained	 to	 identify	whether	 the	 software	 is	malicious	or	not.	They	achieved	over	80%	accuracy	in	almost	any	type	of	setup.	The	algorithms	they	use	are	3-NN,	Perceptron	(ANN)	and	Random	Forests	and	all	of	them	achieved	very	good	results.		Another	study	that	also	uses	information	from	the	power	outlet	is	presented	in	(Clark,	et	al.	2013).	However,	 in	 this	study	the	 focus	 is	on	 identifying	webpages	from	one	another.	Similarly	to	(Fu,	et	al.	2013),	they	are	using	machine	learning	in	order	to	classify	the	webpages	based	on	power	consumption.	However,	they	are	first	moving	the	data	in	frequency	domain	as	unlabeled	500-dimensional	feature	vectors.	Then	they	run	several	support	vector	machines	in	order	to	classify	it	properly.	Just	like	the	previous	study,	the	machine	learning	approach	obtained	98%	accuracy.	The	accuracy	is	significant	even	if	they	only	used	5	webpages.	Another	problem	such	as	Return	Oriented	Programming	on	servers	also	has	been	 shown	 to	be	potentially	 solvable	by	Support	Vector	Machines	 in	 (Pfaff,	Hack	and	 Hammer	 2015).	 Compared	 to	 the	 previously	mentioned	work,	 the	 important	
side	of	this	study	is	the	fact	that	they	use	hardware	performance	counters	(such	as	TLB	misses,	mispredicted	return	branches,	cache	stalls,	etc.).			This	 research	 studies	 inspired	me	 to	 use	 a	 side	 channel	measurement	 and	create	models	 using	machine	 learning.	 I	 decided	 to	monitor	 the	 cache	 in	 order	 to	obtain	my	hardware	performance	counter	and	then	use	the	machine	learning		
	
Software	Used	The	 most	 important	 software	 I’m	 using	 in	 order	 to	 gather	 data	 are	 Gem5	(Binkert,	et	al.	2011)	for	simulation	and	Weka	(Hall,	et	al.	2009)	for	evaluating	the	crypto	algorithms	one	against	each	other.	
Gem5		 Gem5	 is	 an	 open-source	 simulator	 that	 can	 be	 used	 to	 gather	 Hardware	performance	 counters	 of	 a	 program/system	 running	 on	 a	 particular	 hardware	model.	It	supports	multiple	hardware	platforms,	such	as:	Alpha,	SPARC,	ARM,	MIPS,	X86	 and	 can	 run	 on	 almost	 any	 modern	 operating	 system	 (Binkert,	 et	 al.	 2011).	Gem5	also	supports	multiple	CPU	models	(from	a	simple	instruction	in	order	CPU	to	an	out	of	order	CPI	detailed	module).		 One	 of	 the	 most	 important	 features	 of	 the	 simulator	 is	 its	 flexible	 API	 (in	Python	and	Ruby)	 that	 can	be	used	 to	 create	a	 simulator	 that	 follows	a	particular	setup	and	gathers	only	data	 related	 to	a	 certain	HPC	 the	user	 is	 interested	 in.	For	example,	 if	 the	 user	 is	 only	 interested	 in	 measuring	 information	 related	 to	 the	memory	 busses,	 he	 can	 write	 a	 Ruby	 or	 Python	 script	 that	 sets	 a	 particular	architecture	 up	 (e.g.	 CPU	 Models,	 Memory	 sizes,	 Cache	 sizes,	 etc…)	 and	 then	measure	only	memory	busses	information	such	as	memory	snoops.		 The	simulator,	however,	comes	with	modes	that	make	simulating	programs	much	 easier.	 The	 modes	 are	 basically	 flexible	 python	 scripts	 that	 setup	 the	environment	 based	 on	 certain	 input	 flags	 that	 the	 user	 can	 give.	 The	 two	 most	important	 modes	 are	 System-call	 emulation	 (SE)	 mode	 and	 Full-System	 (FS)	 as	presented	in	(Binkert,	et	al.	2011).	SE	creates	a	mini	environment	specified	by	the	user	in	which	it	can	run	an	executable	file	while	FS	is	a	much	more	complex	mode	that	 can	simulate	a	 full	operating	system	and	other	devices	 linked	 to	 it.	When	 the	simulation	 is	 finished,	 Gem5	 gives	 a	 statistics	 file	 that	 contains	 important	 data	regarding	how	the	hardware	behaved	(such	as	the	number	of	cache	misses,	memory	control	reads,	etc.).		 Another	feature	of	Gem5	that	is	of	special	importance	to	my	work	in	program	recognition	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 provides	 runtime	 Tracing	 information.	 Some	 CPU	models	 are	 offering	 precise	 timing	 information	 for	 all	 the	 operations	 and	 Tracing	offers	 the	 opportunity	 to	 achieve	 timestamps	 for	 all	 the	 particular	 HPC	 that	 are	monitored.	This	plays	a	very	important	role	in	program	recognition	based	on	cache	monitoring	because	it	offers	more	than	only	the	information	given	by	the	statistics	file.	 Using	 runtime	 information	 gives	 us	 flexibility	 in	 creating	 different	models	 of	taking	 measurements	 and	 analyzing	 them	 in	 order	 to	 better	 distinguish	 among	programs.	
Weka	Weka	is	data-mining	software	that	provides	easy	access	to	many	state-of-the-art	techniques	in	machine	learning	(Hall,	et	al.	2009).	The	software	takes	in	data	(in	the	 csv	 format	or	 in	 its	own	arff	 format)	 and	 then	offers	 an	easy	 to	use	Graphical	User	 Interface	 that	 can	 be	 used	 to	 perform	 Data	 Mining	 running	 fairly	 complex	machine	 learning	 algorithms.	 	 Although	 it	 contains	 many	 algorithms	 already	implemented	 in	 the	 stable	 version,	Weka	 allows	 you	 to	 import	 different	 libraries	into	 its	 core	 and	 run	 that	 particular	 implementation.	 One	 of	 the	 most	 popular	examples	 is	LibSVM	 introduced	 in	 (Chang	and	Lin	2011)	 that	does	not	 come	with	Weka,	 but	 can	be	 easily	 integrated	 in	 it	 so	 that	 it	 can	be	used	 just	 like	one	of	 the	already	implemented	algorithms.	I	decided	 to	use	Weka	because	 it	has	all	 the	algorithms	planned	 to	be	used	already	implemented.	Moreover,	it	was	used	in	the	related	work	presented	in	(Clark,	et	al.	2013)	where	they	obtained	great	results.		 	
3.2	Methodology	The	 goal	 of	 this	 project	 is	 to	 investigate	 whether	 running	 codes	 can	 be	correctly	 classified	 on	 a	 specific	 platform	 by	measuring	 certain	HPCs.	 In	 order	 to	tackle	 this	 big	 problem,	 the	 task	 can	 be	 broken	 down	 into	 the	 following	 pieces:	choosing	 the	 platform,	 choosing	 the	 programs	 to	 distinguish	 among,	 choosing	 the	HPCs	 to	 measure,	 creating	 an	 automatic	 simulation	 pipe	 and	 finally	 running	 the	machine	learning	algorithms	to	see	the	results.		The	 proposed	 hardware	 architecture	 for	 this	 tool	 is	 ARM.	 (Investopedia	2015)	presents	key	information	that	promotes	ARM	platforms	over	any	other	in	the	embedded	market.	First	of	all,	the	market	share	of	the	company	is	85%	on	the	apps	processor	market	and	65%	on	the	computer	peripherals	market.	This	means	that	at	the	current	time,	the	tool	would	satisfy	more	than	half	of	the	market	it	is	targeting.	Moreover,	(Investopedia	2015)	also	presents	how	the	chips	are	becoming	more	and	more	popular	by	achieving	a	growth	of	20%	in	2014	in	number	of	chips	shipped.		Choosing	the	programs	to	distinguish	among	was	fairly	complicated.	The	goal	in	 choosing	 the	 programs	 is	 having	 many	 programs	 that	 have	 a	 common	 theme,	along	with	programs	that	are	completely	different	and	programs	that	are	different	implementations	 of	 the	 same	 algorithm.	 Since	 the	 work	 investigates	 problems	related	to	cryptography,	I	decided	to	use	one	of	the	crypto	libraries	and	run	most	of	the	 programs	 that	 can	 easily	 be	 simulated	with	 Gem5.	 Running	 algorithms	 of	 the	same	 theme	 provides	 insight	 on	 how	 easy	 it	 is	 to	 distinguish	 different	 crypto	algorithms	 from	 each	 other.	 The	 library	 chosen	 is	 mbedTLS	 instead	 of	 the	 most	popular	OpenSSL	is	because	mbedTLS	is	optimized	for	running	on	ARM	processors	and	OpenSSL	is	not.	OpenSSL	runs	as	a	server,	reason	why	it	is	hard	to	break	it	down	into	 smaller	 pieces	 that	 can	 be	 easily	 simulated	with	 precise	measurements.	 The	algorithms	 I	 chose	 from	 mbedTLS	 are:	 AES	 Encryption,	 AES	 Decryption,	 RSA	Encryption,	RSA	Decryption,	RSA	Sign,	RSA	Verify	 Signature,	DES	Encryption,	DES	Decryption,	M5	hashing,	SHA1	hashing,	SHA256	hashing,	SHA512	hashing.	Along	 with	 the	 algorithms	 from	 mbedTLS,	 I	 decided	 to	 run	 one	 different	implementation	 of	 AES	 (more	 precisely	 the	 OpenSSL	 implementation)	 and	 see	whether	 it	 can	 easily	 be	 recognizable	 which	 one	 is	 which.	 Running	 these	 two	implementations	 against	 each	 other	 is	 interesting	 and	 provides	 good	 insight	 into	seeing	 how	 different	 implementations	 of	 the	 same	 algorithm	 can	 be.	 AES	 form	OpenSSL	 and	 mbedTLS	 are	 both	 implementation	 of	 the	 T-Table	 variant	 of	 the	algorithm.		Three	 more	 algorithms	 that	 do	 not	 have	 much	 in	 common	 with	 the	 ones	presented	so	far	were	added.	These	programs	are	Matrix	Multiplication,	Merge	Sort	followed	 by	 Binary	 Search,	 and	 finally	 Simon	 Encryption	 and	 Decryption.	 Matrix	multiplication	should	be	a	cache	intensive	operation,	Merge	Sort	and	Binary	Search	are	not	used	 in	any	of	 the	crypto	algorithms,	 reason	why	 it	 is	expected	 that	 these	two	algorithms	will	be	easily	distinguishable.	However,	the	last	algorithm	is	a	Feistel	cipher	just	like	DES.	Due	to	the	lightweight	nature	of	Simon,	it	is	expected	that	they	will	be	distinguishable,	but	not	necessarily	without	some	confusion.	Similarly	 to	 the	 works	 presented	 in	 (Pfaff,	 Hack	 and	 Hammer	 2015)	 and	(Clark,	 et	 al.	 2013),	 the	 HPCs	 decided	 upon	 are	 related	 to	 caches.	 Cache	 data	
measured	and	used	 in	 this	project	 are:	 icache	Read	Hits,	 dcache	Read	Hits,	 icache	Read	Misses,	dCache	Read	Misses,	icache	Write	Hits,	dcache	Write	Hits,	icache	Write	Misses,	 dcache	Write	Misses,	 icache	 Hit	 Average,	 dcache	Hit	 Average,	 icache	Miss	Average,	dcache	Miss	Average.		In	creating	an	automatic	pipe,	making	the	scenario	as	realistic	as	possible	is	challenging.	Since	the	measurements	are	taken	in	a	simulator,	they	are	idealistic,	i.e.	they	have	no	noise.	Gem5	has	the	ability	to	give	us	detailed	cache	information	based	on	clock	cycles	in	the	System-call	Emulator	mode,	reason	why	I	decided	to	use	the	tracing	information	and	try	to	post-process	it	instead	of	just	using	the	statistics	file	that	 provides	 information	 for	 the	 entire	 runtime.	 It	 seems	 reasonable	 that	 in	 real	world,	 the	setup	would	be	monitoring	 the	cache	 for	a	period	of	 time	and	then	use	the	information	on	an	already	trained	model	and	classify	it.	Therefore,	I	decided	to	take	into	considerations	the	cache	information	obtained	only	in	a	fixed	time	interval	(window	 size).	 One	 of	 the	 side	 goals	 of	 this	 work	 is	 to	 also	 investigate	 different	window	sizes	and	see	how	it	affects	the	accuracy	of	the	classification.	In	reality,	it	is	impossible	 to	measure	all	 the	 cache	data	provided	by	a	 simulator.	 In	 general,	 you	can	only	measure	information	related	to	a	single	cache.	This	work	also	investigates	which	cache	information	is	most	relevant	and	should	be	used	for	gathering	data	in	a	realistic	environment.	After	the	cache	data	is	processed,	the	only	step	left	 is	to	 input	the	data	into	Weka	and	try	to	create	different	models	that	give	better	accuracy.	In	all	scenarios	I	am	trying	to	correctly	identify	the	source	of	a	running	program,	which	is	by	itself	a	much	 harder	 problem	 than	 identifying	whether	 a	 running	 program	 comes	 from	 a	specific	source	or	not.		 	
3.3.	Implementation	and	Results	
Code	Distinction	Implementation	There	were	three	stages	of	the	implementation:	Cache	Simulation,	Cache	data	processing,	Train	and	test	models	based	from	data	gathered.	In	this	section	I	present	more	detailed	information	regarding	the	implementation	of	all	three	stages	and	then	analyze	the	results.		
Cache	Simulation	Simulating	 the	 results	 is	 mostly	 related	 to	 Gem5.	 First	 step	 was	 installing	Gem5	and	running	 it.	There	are	multiple	build	versions	 to	choose	 from:	 the	stable	version	–	good	for	when	all	the	functionality	needed	is	already	provided	–,	the	dev	version	–	which	is	great	in	case	you	want	to	make	quick	modifications.	Because	the	current	software	provided	all	the	functionality	needed	for	this	project,	I	decided	to	use	the	stable	build.		Running	Gem5	is	done	via	a	bash	command.	First,	you	need	to	build	Gem5	for	the	platform	needed	and	then	simply	run	the	executable	created	by	the	build.	There	are	many	platforms	supported,	but	since	my	goal	is	to	investigate	algorithms	on	an	ARM,	 I	 only	 built	 I	 Gem5	 for	 ARM	 and	 set	 it	 so	 that	 it	 allows	 me	 to	 do	 timing	information	with	it.		To	run	Gem5	in	System-call	emulator,	I	needed	to	run	a	bash	script	in	which	I	specify	certain	flags	hardware	specific	information.	The	hardware	parameters	were	chosen	 to	 simulate	 a	 real	 system	 (one	 that	 you	 could	 end	 up	 having	 in	 a	mobile	device).	The	data	can	be	seen	in	Table	3.		
Table	3:	Cache	Parameters	L1D	Size	 64	kB	L1	I	Size	 64	kB	L2	Size	 256	kB	L3	Size	 2MB	L1	D	Associativity	 8	way	L1	I	Associativity	 8	way	L2	Associativity	 16	way	L3	Associativity	 16	way	Cache	Line	Size	 64	B		 A	bash	script	that	runs	Gem5	in	SE	mode	looks	like	the	following:	
 
build/ARM/gem5.opt --debug-flags=Cache configs/example/se.py  
--cmd=programs/BinarySearch/binarysearch --cpu-type=TimingSimpleCPU  
--options=43887758 --l1d_size=64kB --l1i_size=64kB --l2_size=256kB  
--l3_size=2MB --l1d_assoc=8 --l1i_assoc=8 --l2_assoc=16 --l3_assoc=16  
--cacheline_size=64 –caches 	
In	 this	 command,	 the	 parameters	 corresponding	 to	 cache	 information	presented	above	can	easily	be	identified.	Along	with	those	parameters,	I	use	the	flag	“-caches”	which	is	needed	for	the	simulator	to	take	all	the	other	cache	information	into	 account.	 The	 flag	 --debug-flags	 tells	 the	 program	 to	 output	 the	 trace	 of	 the	simulation	 that	 is	 related	 to	 the	 flags	 inputted.	 The	 debug	 flag	 “Cache”	 gives	everything	I	need	for	this	project.	However,	others	such	as	“Registers”,	“Exec”	can	be	used.	 The	 --cmd	 flag	 tells	 Gem5	which	 executable	 to	 run,	 --cpu-type	 specifies	 the	type	of	the	CPU	and	options	are	arguments	given	to	the	main	function	at	runtime.	I	decided	to	use	the	cpu-type	“TimingSimpleCPU”	because	it	accurately	keeps	track	of	the	 times	 at	which	 any	 cache	operation	 is	 done.	 se.py	 is	 the	 System-call	 emulator	script.	The	output	of	 this	bash	command	 is	some	basic	Gem5	information	plus	 the	Trace	of	the	cache.	After	 getting	 the	 Trace	 information,	 the	 next	 step	 is	 processing	 it.	 The	processing	happens	the	following	way:	choose	a	window	size	(in	clock	cycle),	pick	a	random	starting	clock-cycle	and	then	go	through	all	the	cache	information	from	the	starting	 clock	 cycle	 for	 the	 duration	 of	 the	 window	 size	 and	 count/compute	 the	following	 information:	 icache	 Read	 Hits,	 dcache	 Read	 Hits,	 icache	 Read	 Misses,	dcache	 Read	 Misses,	 icache	 Write	 Hits,	 dcache	 Write	 Hits,	 icache	 Write	 Misses,	dcache	Write	Misses,	 icache	Hit	Average,	dcache	Hit	Average,	 icache	Miss	Average,	dcache	Miss	Average.	The	last	step	is	putting	all	this	information	into	an	arff	file	that	can	be	read	by	Weka	and	measure	all	the	data.		The	 steps	 above	 had	 to	 be	 automated	 in	 order	 to	 get	 enough	 information.	Due	to	the	scripting	nature	of	the	problem,	I	chose	to	write	the	program	in	Python.	The	program	runs	in	2	steps:		Step1:	Run	each	program	10	times	with	different	 inputs	(all	of	 them	random)	and	save	each	of	them	in	a	trace	file.	Step2:	 Run	 1000	window	measurements	 for	 each	 of	 the	 10	 Trace	 files	 and	 place	them	all	in	a	.arff	file.	I	 implemented	 the	 first	 step	 in	 2	 classes:	 one	 called	 “Simulation”	 and	 one	called	“CacheParser”.		Simulation	can	 instantiate	a	simulation	for	any	of	 the	programs	chosen	and	output	its	trace	file.	Then,	in	order	to	run	a	big	number	of	simulations,	you	only	need	to	specify	which	programs	you	want	 to	run	and	how	many	simulations	of	each.	 In	order	to	add	a	new	program,	you	need	to	specify	the	structure	of	the	program	in	the	class.	Another	 important	 functionality	 that	 is	 being	 taken	 care	 of	 by	 Simulation	 is	randomness.	All	 the	programs	 run	on	 random	 inputs	 so	 that	 the	 input	data	 is	 the	least	 biased.	 Since	 a	 simulation	 starts	 at	 time	 0,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 create	 any	randomness	form	inside	(seeding	the	random	function	with	any	timing	information	will	 be	 relative	 to	 the	 simulation	 time,	which	 always	 occurs	 after	 the	 same	 clock	cycles).	For	this,	Simulation	instantiates	a	random	seed	and	sends	it	to	Gem5	via	the	–options	flag.		CacheParser	takes	the	Trace	output	from	the	Simulation	and	processes	it	into	a	 smaller	 file	with	 concise	 information	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 used	 for	 creating	 the	 arff	files.	It	does	this	by	searching	the	lines	of	the	file	for	key	words	and	processes	them	into	 just	 a	 handful	 of	 information	 that	 is	 needed	 for	 future	 processing.	 This	 file	parsing	 has	 many	 advantages:	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 it	 allows	 the	 more	 computing	
intensive	 operations	 like	 counting	 and	 computing	 cache	 information	 in	 a	 time	window	to	be	done	faster;	on	the	other	hand,	the	Trace	files	are	very	big	and	storing	so	much	information	that	needs	to	be	processed	later	would	be	very	expensive.			
	
Figure	7:	Trace	information	before	processing	Figure	 7	 shows	 how	 an	 output	 trace	 file	 looks	 like	 after	 just	 running	 a	simulation	 and	 Figure	 8	 shows	 how	 similar	 information	 looks	 like	 after	 being	processed.	 In	 Figure	 8,	 column	 one	 represents	 the	 clock	 cycle,	 column	 two	 says	whether	it	is	a	dcache	or	an	icache	operation,	column	three	says	yes	when	there	is	a	Read	operation	and	False	when	there	is	a	Write	operation,	and	finally	column	four	says	True	 if	 it	was	 a	 cache	 hit	 and	 False	 if	 it	was	 a	miss.	 These	 four	 columns	 are	enough	for	gathering	all	the	information	needed	when	going	with	a	timing	window	over	the	data.	
	
Figure	8:	Cache	information	after	processing	the	trace	file	
	 The	second	step	is	implemented	by	only	one	other	class	called	“Arff”.	What	it	does	 is	 to	 loop	 through	different	 timing	window	size	 (more	precisely	1	000	 clock	cycles,	10	000	clock	cycles,	100	000	clock	cycles	and	1	000	000	clock	cycles)	and	for	each	of	them	it	creates	an	arff	output	file.	The	file	contains	1000	measurements	of	each	 algorithm	 put	 together.	 The	 measurements	 happen	 for	 a	 fixed	 number	 of	cycles,	 but	 the	 initial	 clock	 cycle	 where	 we	 start	 measuring	 from	 is	 chosen	 at	random.			
Training	and	Testing	and	Results	In	 order	 to	 better	 explain	 the	 results,	 this	 section	 of	 the	 reports	 was	 split	based	 on	 the	 window	 sizes	 used.	 Because	 each	 of	 them	 is	 a	 completely	 different	dataset,	 I	will	 analyze	 not	 only	 the	 accuracies,	 but	 also	 some	of	 the	 visualizations	that	Weka	 outputs.	 Because	 one	 of	 the	 goals	 in	 mind	 is	 to	 make	 the	 scenario	 as	realistic	 as	 possible,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 also	 investigate	 which	 of	 the	 cache	parameters	provide	most	insight.	In	a	real-world	setup,	one	can	only	observe	a	small	cache	area	and	it	is	important	to	understand	where	the	focus	should	be.		Some	 of	 the	 common	 pre-processing	 techniques	 used	 are	 removing	duplicates	 and	 unsupervised	 resampling.	 Removing	 duplicates	 could	 be	 of	 use	 in	some	 algorithms	 like	 decision	 trees	 where	 they	 do	 not	 really	 offer	 additional	information.	 However,	 duplicates	 may	 be	 important	 for	 algorithms	 like	 Neural	Networks	 where	 adjusting	 the	 weights	 multiple	 times	 could	 be	 very	 important.	Unsupervised	 resampling	 chooses	 at	 random	 only	 a	 fraction	 of	 the	 whole	 data	points.	This	 is	 important	because	 slower	algorithms	 like	Support	Vector	Machines	and	Neural	Networks	take	very	long	to	train	and	test	on	such	a	big	dataset.		
Another	important	technique	used	in	this	project	is	feature	subset	selection	introduced	 in	 (Hall	 1999).	 This	 technique	 computes	 a	 Feature	 Evaluation	 that	assumes	that	better	characteristics	are	closer	related	with	the	class	(in	this	case	the	programs	 I	 try	 to	 distinguish	 among)	 and	 also	 least	 correlated	 with	 other	characteristics.	 In	 other	 words,	 a	 good	 attribute	 needs	 to	 have	 information	 that	leads	us	to	the	correct	result,	but	cannot	be	obtained	from	(or	used	to	obtain)	other	attributes.		
Window	Size:	1	000	Before	 diving	 into	 any	machine	 learning	 algorithms,	 first	 it	 is	 important	 to	look	at	the	data	and	try	to	understand	what	cache	data	gives	good	information.	For	all	 the	 graphs	 below,	 different	 colors	 represent	 different	 programs	 and	 the	 x-axis	generally	 represents	 the	 relevant	 number	 (for	 averages,	 it	 is	 a	 ratio	 and	 for	 the	other	information	it	is	a	count	of	either	hits	or	misses).	In	figure	labels,	cc	represents	“clock	cycles”.	
	
Figure	9:	icache	Read	Hits	Window	1000	cc	
	
Figure	10:	dcache	Read	Hits	Window	1000	cc	
As	it	can	be	observed	from	Figure	9	and	Figure	10,	the	number	of	hits	is	fairly	well	 distributed	 (x-axis	 represents	 the	 number	 of	 hits	 in	 a	 given	 window	 size).	There	 is	much	uniformity	and	 it	 is	not	much	 that	 can	 really	be	 concluded	only	by	looking	at	these	two	graphs.	
	
Figure	11:	dcache	Read	Misses	Window	1000	cc	
	
Figure	12:	icache	Read	Misses	1000	cc		 In	Figure	11	and	Figure	12	it	is	shown	the	number	of	misses.	Although	it	may	offer	 some	 good	 insight,	 it	 is	 obvious	 that	 data	 is	 skewed	 towards	 0.	 A	 potential	reason	for	this	to	happen	is	the	fact	that	the	window	size	is	only	1000	cc	and	it	does	not	provide	enough	time	for	misses	to	occur	(it	is	well	known	that	good	caches	have	a	high	hit	percentage).		 As	expected,	Figure	13	shows	that	there	are	no	icache	writes	and	therefore	there	are	neither	misses	nor	hits	related	to	it.	
	
Figure	13:	icache	Write	Hits	and	icache	Write	Misses	Window	1000	cc		
	
Figure	14:	dcache	Write	Hits	Window	1000	cc		
	
Figure	15:	dcache	Write	Misses	Window	1000	cc	Figure	14	and	Figure	15	present	the	data	cache	writes.	Similarly	to	what	was	seen	in	the	icache	read	misses,	the	dcache	Write	Misses	are	also	skewed	towards	0.	
This	again	is	a	sign	of	a	too	small	window	size.	Also,	just	as	before,	the	hits	are	fairly	well	 distributed	 and	 it	 is	 expected	 that	 they	 will	 be	 useful.	 The	 number	 of	 hits	however	 show	 very	 well	 distributed	 data	 out	 of	 which	 many	 conclusions	 can	 be	drawn.	
	
Figure	16:	icache	Hit	Average	Window	1000	cc	
	
Figure	17:	dcache	Hit	Average	Window	1000	cc	Just	as	expected	 from	previous	graphs,	Figure	16	and	Figure	17	show	well-distributed	 data	 for	 hit	 averages.	 Averages	 are	 obtained	 from	 counts	 that	 are	normalized	per	clock	cylces.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Figure	 18	 and	 Figure	 19	 show	 very	 little	 usable	information	for	reasons	mentioned	above.	
	
Figure	18:	icache	Miss	Average	Window	1000	cc	
	
Figure	19:	icache	Miss	Average	Window	1000	cc		 The	 first	 algorithm	 I	 run	 on	 this	 data	 is	 Decision	 Trees.	 The	 only	 pre-processing	 needed	 for	 it	 is	 removing	 duplicates.	 An	 interesting	 figure	 that	 shows	how	the	data	looks	like	after	removing	all	the	duplicates	is	shown	in	Figure	20.	On	the	top	of	the	figure,	there	is	an	enumeration	with	the	count	of	data	points	for	each	program	 while	 on	 the	 bottom,	 there	 is	 a	 graph	 drawn	 to	 make	 it	 easier	 to	understand	 the	 ratios.	 All	 the	 programs	 started	with	 10	 000	 data	 points	 and	 the	figure	now	shows	that	at	least	half	the	data	is	the	same	for	each	program	(for	some	programs	more	than	70%	of	the	data	seems	to	have	duplicates).	
	
Figure	20:	Data	after	removing	duplicates	Window	1000	cc	The	 time	 it	 took	 to	 build	 the	 decision	 tree	model	 was	 11.24	 seconds.	 The	decision	 tree	built	on	 this	data	obtains	46.7%	accuracy.	However,	 taking	a	 look	at	the	confusion	matrix	from	Figure	21,	some	important	observations	can	be	made.	
	
Figure	21:	Decision	Tree	confusion	matrix		 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 for	 Simon,	 for	 both	 versions	 of	 AES,	 and	 for	 DES,	 the	program	cannot	basically	distinguish	among	encryption	and	decryption.	This	could	
already	 be	 a	 sign	 that	 for	 symmetric	 cryptography,	 there	 is	 no	 need	 to	 separate	decryption	from	encryption	and	that	training	only	on	encryptions	could	be	enough	to	 identify	 the	program.	Another	 interesting	aspect	 that	 can	be	seen	right	away	 is	the	fact	that	the	two	different	implementations	of	AES	are	easy	to	distinguish	from	each	other.	Another	weakness	that	can	be	seen	right	away	is	distinguishing	among	different	RSA	algorithms.	 It	 looks	 like	many	of	 them	are	 falsely	classified	although	the	right	operation	is	classified	slightly	more	than	the	others.		 Removing	 the	 decryption	 data	 points	 for	 symmetric	 cryptography,	 and	rerunning	a	decision	tree	on	the	remaining	data	obtained	an	accuracy	of	62.8%	with	the	confusion	matrix	shown	in	Figure	22.	Again	it	is	easy	to	identify	that	RSA	is	very	hard	to	classify	and	now	most	of	the	inaccuracies	come	from	it.	
	
Figure	22:	Confusion	matrix	after	removing	symmetric	cipher	decryption	points	RSA	Sign	and	RSA	Decrypt	have	the	same	core	operation	and	it	is	likely	that	they	could	be	one	of	the	main	reasons	for	this	confusion.	Running	one	more	time	the	decision	 tree	 after	 removing	 RSA	 Sign	 obtains	 66.4243%	 accuracy.	 The	 tree	 has	3313	leaves	and	is	very	complex.	The	confusion	matrix	for	this	most	accurate	tree	is	presented	in	Figure	23.	It	is	obvious	that	decision	trees	behave	very	poorly	on	RSA	algorithms	for	the	smallest	window	size	and	it	 is	also	not	very	accurate	 in	general	for	most	of	the	algorithms.	
	
Figure	23:	Confusion	matrix	after	removing	RSA	Sign	in	Decision	Tree		 The	 next	 algorithm	 I	 run	 is	 Neural	 networks.	 For	 running	 it	 in	 reasonable	time,	 I	will	perform	unsupervised	resampling	to	25%	of	 the	data	(the	operation	 is	
performed	on	the	original	dataset).	Training	the	model	on	the	remaining	data	took	almost	 4	 minutes.	 The	 accuracy	 obtained	 was	 disappointingly	 43.1822%.	 The	confusion	matrix	can	be	seen	in	Figure	24.	As	expected,	the	symmetric	cryptography	is	 also	 week	 in	 distinguishing	 between	 encryption	 and	 decryption	 in	 symmetric	cryptography	and	it	is	also	confusing	RSA	Decrypt	with	RSA	Sign	on	many	cases.	
	
Figure	24:	Confusion	matrix	for	Neural	Net	Just	 like	 for	 Decision	 trees,	 I	 decided	 to	 run	 the	 Neural	 Network	 on	 the	dataset	 after	 removing	 RSA	 Sign	 and	 symmetric	 crypto	 decryption.	 This	 time	 I	resampled	 to	 only	 10%	 of	 the	 data,	 which	 should	 still	 be	 enough	 for	 the	 neural	network.	The	accuracy	 is	 still	 small	although	 it	 increased	 to	51.8%.	The	confusion	matrix	for	this	experiment	is	shown	in	Figure	25.	It	looks	like	the	RSA	operations	are	just	as	hard	to	distinguish	among	each	other	 in	neural	nets	as	they	are	in	decision	trees.	
	
Figure	25:	Confusion	matrix	for	Neural	Net	after	removing	symmetric	crypto	decryption	and	RSA	Sign	Naïve	 Bayes	 scores	 only	 a	 10%	 while	 a	 regular	 Bayes	 Net	 scores	 43.36%	accuracy.	 They	 are	 both	 running	much	 faster	 than	 the	 other	 algorithms,	 but	 their	accuracies	are	also	much	 lower.	Figure	26	shows	the	confusion	matrix	 for	a	Bayes	net.	 Since	 the	 numbers	 are	 so	 poorly	 distributed,	 there	 is	 no	 reason	 to	 insist	 in	trying	to	get	a	better	accuracy	on	Bayes	Nets.	
	
Figure	26:	Bayes	Net	confusion	matrix	The	last	algorithm	I	used	is	Support	Vector	Machines.	I’m	running	the	libSVM	implementation	 of	 the	 algorithm	 with	 the	 default	 configuration.	 Important	 to	mention	 is	 that	 I	 used	 “radial	 basis	 function”	 for	Kernel	Type.	 The	pre-processing	done	to	the	original	dataset	before	running	SVM	on	 it	 is	resampling	to	10%	of	 the	original	data.	It	took	78	seconds	to	build	the	model	and	the	accuracy	is	52.9%.	It	is	the	 highest	 accuracy	 of	 any	 algorithm	 so	 far	 before	 eliminating	 any	 of	 the	algorithms.	However,	looking	at	the	confusion	matrix	from	Figure	27,	it	seems	that	except	for	the	regular	confusions	that	all	algorithms	before	struggled	with,	SVM	are	predicting	everything	else	much	more	accurately.	
	
Figure	27:	Initial	SVM	Confusion	Matrix	After	 removing	 symmetric	 crypto	 decryption	 and	 RSA	 Sign,	 applying	 the	same	 resampling,	 I	 ran	 SVM	again.	 This	 time	 it	 took	 only	 38	 seconds	 to	 build	 the	model	and	the	accuracy	was	64.8%.	Although	not	as	good	as	the	decision	tree,	 the	model	is	fairly	accurate	for	many	of	the	programs.	If	we	wanted	to	investigate	how	easy	 is	 it	 to	 identify	 on	 an	 one	 versus	 all	 matter,	 Figure	 28	 shows	 that	 many	programs	would	be	having	good	results.	RSA	operations	are	hard	to	handle	for	SVM	as	well	and	also	DES	seems	to	be	easily	misclassified	by	the	SVM.	
	
Figure	28:	SVM	Confusion	Matrix	after	eliminating	symmetric	crypto	decryption	and	RSA	Sign		 Overall,	 it	 can	be	 concluded	 that	 a	 small	window	 like	1000	cycles	does	not	provide	enough	information	to	obtain	good	distinction	between	programs.	So	far	the	probabilistic	models	 have	 proven	 to	 behave	 poorly	 at	 classifying	 these	 programs.	Neural	Networks	and	SVM	are	much	slower	to	build	than	decision	trees	and	none	of	them	scores	better	than	decision	trees.	However,	the	best	two	algorithms	so	far	are	Decision	Trees	and	SVM.		One	 interesting	 result	 is	 the	 accuracy	 in	 predicting	 one	 implementation	 of	AES	 against	 the	 other	 (OpenSSL	 vs	 mbedTLS).	 Although	 they	 are	 both	 T-table	implementations,	 for	some	reason	almost	all	 the	algorithms	were	very	accurate	at	figuring	out	which	one	is	which.			
Table	4:	Summary	of	accuracies	for	window	of	size	1000	cc	Algorithm	 Accuracy	Naïve	Bayes	 10%	Bayes	Nets	 43.4%	Decision	Trees	 66.4%	Support	Vector	Machine	 64.8%	Neural	Network	 51.8%		 In	order	to	investigate	which	cache	parameters	are	most	important,	we	run	Correlation	 Based	 Feature-Selection	 on	 our	 dataset.	 Running	 it	 on	 my	 dataset	 in	Weka	and	telling	it	to	only	hold	up	to	the	best	5,	it	gave	me	three	columns	that	are	most	 relevant:	 dcacheReadHits,	 dcacheWriteHits,	 icacheHitAverage.	 Impressively,	running	 Decision	 Trees	 and	 SVM	 (the	 best	 2	 scoring	 algorithms)	 obtained	 fairly	good	 results	 with	 9	 less	 parameters	 than	 before,	 more	 precisely:	 Decision	 Trees	accuracy	is	66.2%,	only	.2%	behind	the	initial	accuracy,	and	SVM	accuracy	is	61.1%,	about	 3.7%	 behind	 the	 previous	 accuracy.	 Comparing	 this	 information	 to	 higher	window	sizes	is	of	extreme	importance	for	understanding	which	parameters	weight	more	than	others.	
Window	Size:	10	000	cc	Similarly	to	what	I	presented	in	the	1	000	cc	window	size,	I	will	first	present	some	visualizations	first	in	order	to	understand	the	data.	Before	moving	into	them,	it	 is	 important	 to	mention	 that	 icacheWriteHits	and	 icacheWriteMisses	again	have	count	0	and	won’t	be	shown	in	any	figure.		
	
Figure	29:	icache	Read	Hits	10	000	cc	window	size	
	
Figure	30:	dcache	Read	Hits	10	000	cc	window	size		 Compared	to	Figure	9	and	Figure	10,	it	can	clearly	be	seen	that	the	data	looks	more	distributed	in	Figure	29	and	Figure	30	where	we	have	a	bigger	window	size.	This	doesn’t	come	as	a	surprise	since	a	bigger	window	size	is	likely	to	include	more	cache	misses	 than	we	had	 in	 the	previous	data	 set;	 of	 course,	more	misses	would	affect	the	number	of	hits	as	well.	
	
Figure	31:	icache	Read	Misses	10	000	cc	
	
Figure	32:	dcache	Read	Misses	10	000	cc	One	can	observe	in	Figure	31	and	Figure	32	the	number	of	cache	read	misses.	Although	 it	 offers	 much	 more	 information	 than	 before,	 the	 data	 is	 still	 clearly	skewed	 towards	 0	 (so	 much	 that	 the	 first	 bin	 is	 larger	 than	 all	 the	 other	 ones	combined).	 However,	 compared	 to	 a	 1	 000	 cc	 window	 size	 when	 this	 info	 was	basically	saying	nothing	(the	highest	number	of	misses	did	not	even	exceed	18),	a	higher	window	size	allows	this	parameter	to	be	more	relevant.	As	 expected,	 the	 write	 hits	 presented	 in	 Figure	 33	 and	 the	 write	 misses	presented	 in	Figure	34	are	also	more	relevant,	 in	the	same	way	the	Read	Hits	and	the	Read	Misses	are.	
	
Figure	33:	dcache	Write	Hits	10	000	cc	
	
Figure	34:	dcache	Write	Misses	10	000	cc		 Since	the	hit	averages	and	the	miss	averages	for	both	caches	are	basically	the	number	 of	 operations	 divided	 by	 a	 constant,	 they	 have	 the	 same	 form	 as	 their	correspondent,	reason	why	I	decided	not	to	add	them	to	the	report.		 Before	going	into	deeper	analysis,	it	is	very	important	to	understand	whether	patterns	from	the	previous	window	size	still	occur.	For	example,	symmetric	crypto	algorithms	 had	 encryption	 and	 decryption	 undistinguishable.	 Similarly,	 the	 RSA	algorithms	that	have	the	same	operation	as	its	basis	were	hard	to	distinguish	–	to	be	more	precise	RSA	Encrypt	from	RSA	Verify	and	RSA	Decrypt	from	RSA	Sign.	With	a	bigger	window	size,	it	is	expected	that	this	pattern	will	be	easier	to	spot.		 First	 run	 Decision	 Trees	 on	 the	 whole	 data	 because	 they	 seem	 to	 behave	fairly	 well	 overall	 and	 also	 they	 are	 one	 of	 the	 fastest	 algorithms	 to	 run.	 The	
accuracy	obtained	by	Decision	Trees	on	 the	whole	data	 is	69.9%!	This	accuracy	 is	higher	 than	 processed	 data	 from	 the	 previous	 window	 size.	 You	 can	 see	 the	confusion	 matrix	 in	 Figure	 35.	 The	 results	 are	 much	 better	 overall	 and	 all	 the	patterns	mentioned	above	are	easily	identifiable.	
	
Figure	35:	Decision	Tree	Initial	Confusion	Matrix	10	000	cc	Because	the	data	behave	similarly,	I	decided	that	for	all	the	algorithms	from	now	on,	I	will	throw	out	simonDecrypt,	AESOpenSSLDecrypt,	AESMBEDTLSDecrypt,	RSA	Sign,	RSA	Verify,	and	DES	Decrypt.		 With	 the	 remaining	 data,	 I	 ran	 a	 new	 Decision	 Tree	 and	 the	 accuracy	 this	time	spiked	to	88.6%	while	the	size	of	the	tree	was	reduced	by	more	than	half	(from	3498	 nodes	 to	 1661).	 Also	 helping	 the	model	 by	 removing	 duplicates	 in	 the	 pre-processing,	 the	 final	 and	 best	 Decision	 Tree	 obtained	 a	 93%	 accuracy	 with	 the	confusion	matrix	that	can	be	seen	in	Figure	36.		
	
Figure	36:	Best	Decision	Tree	Confusion	Matrix	10	000	cc		 Naïve	 Bayes	 obtained	 a	 disappointing	 18%	 accuracy,	 meaning	 that	 it	 is	probably	not	suited	well	for	this	kind	of	problem.	However,	Bayes	Nets	score	69.5%,	which	 is	 significantly	better	 than	 the	behavior	 it	had	on	 the	data	obtained	using	a	smaller	window	size.	A	confusion	matrix	for	Bayes	Nets	is	shown	in	Figure	37	and	it	is	 clear	 from	 it	 that	 most	 of	 the	 symmetric	 crypto	 algorithms	 including	 hash	functions	are	hard	for	it	to	distinguish.		
	
Figure	37:	Bayes	Nets	Confusion	Matrix	10	000	cc				 Because	SVM	and	Neural	Networks	take	so	long	to	train	and	test,	I	decided	to	run	 Correlation-Based	 Feature	 Selection	 and	 choose	 only	 the	 most	 important	attributes.	 CFS	 gives	 dcache	 Read	 Hits,	 dcache	 Write	 Hits,	 dcache	 Write	 Misses,	icache	Hit	Average,	dcache	Hit	Average.	Now	run	the	SVM	and	Neural	Network	only	on	this	attributes	after	resampling	the	data	to	30%	and	removing	duplicates.	SVM	obtained	78.9%	accuracy,	significantly	much	higher	than	in	the	previous	window	 size.	 However,	 the	 result	 is	 still	 far	 behind	 decision	 trees,	 which	 on	 the	original	unprocessed	data	 set	 scored	over	92%.	 Just	 for	 comparison	 reasons,	with	the	 same	 pre-processing,	 Decision	 Trees	 score	 91.3%	 accuracy.	 The	 confusion	matrix	for	the	SVM	is	shown	in	Figure	38.	For	some	reason,	for	a	bigger	window	size	decision	trees	behave	better	on	distinguishing	the	Hash	functions	compared	to	SVM	which	is	still	struggling	on	those	algorithms.	
	
Figure	38:	SVM	Confusion	Matrix	10	000	cc	Running	 the	 Neural	 Network	 on	 the	 same	 processed	 data	 as	 the	 support	vector	machine	obtains	65.5%	accuracy,	much	lower	than	Decision	Trees	and	SVM,	even	lower	than	Bayes	Nets.		 Overall,	it	is	clear	that	a	bigger	window	size	makes	a	significant	difference	in	the	 accuracy	 of	 the	 results.	One	of	 the	most	 surprising	 results	 is	 how	much	more	accurate	 Bayes	 Nets	 end	 up	 being	 compared	 to	 what	 they	 were	 scoring	 on	 the	previous	 measurements	 set.	 Another	 important	 milestone	 was	 achieving	 an	 over	
90%	 accuracy	 using	 decision	 tree	 while	 a	 slightly	 big	 upset	 comes	 from	 the	performance	 of	 Support	 Vector	Machines	 that	 although	 used	 in	most	 of	 the	work	related	 to	 this	 project,	 it	 does	not	 score	 even	 closely	 as	well	 as	 decision	 trees	do.	However,	due	to	the	nature	of	how	decision	trees	function,	it	is	expected	that	a	much	higher	number	of	programs	would	eventually	decrease	the	accuracy	while	support	vector	machines	may	not	decrease	as	much.	Just	 like	 before,	 the	 algorithms	 that	 use	 the	 same	 operations	 are	 almost	impossible	to	distinguish	among	and	most	of	the	algorithms	are	having	a	very	hard	time	 distinguishing	 among	 the	 hash	 algorithms.	 Again	 OpenSSL	 vs	 mbedTLS	 AES	were	very	well	distinguished	and	misclassification	of	DES	does	not	happen	as	often	anymore.	The	reason	why	a	smaller	window	size	may	have	a	hard	time	 is	 the	 fact	that	 there	 are	 just	 not	 enough	 cache	misses	 happening	 so	 that	 the	 algorithm	 can	take	 anything	 into	 account.	 Hits	 generally	 take	 the	 same	 amount	 of	 time	 to	 be	processed	 and	 if	 programs	 end	 up	 having	 no	 (or	 almost	 no)	 cache	 misses,	distinguishing	is	very	hard.		
Table	6:	Summary	of	accuracies	for	window	of	size	1000	cc	Algorithm	 Accuracy	Naïve	Bayes	 18%	Bayes	Nets	 69.5%	Decision	Trees	 93%	Support	Vector	Machine	 78.9%	Neural	Network	 65.5%		 Another	important	result	is	the	fact	that	out	of	5	columns	chosen	by	CFS,	3	of	them	are	the	same	that	were	in	the	previous	window	size:	dcache	Read	Hits,	dcache	Write	Hits,	 icache	Hit	Average.	The	reason	why	this	 information	 is	so	 important	 is	the	 fact	 that	 once	 I	 try	 to	make	 the	 scenario	more	 realistic	 (where	 you	 can	 only	monitor	 only	 some	 isolated	 part	 of	 the	 cache),	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 some	 clear	parameters	that	look	more	interesting	than	others.		
Window	Size:	100	000	cc	Going	to	a	window	size	of	100	000	is	definitely	not	a	viable	option.	Many	of	the	crypto	algorithms	are	very	efficient	and	take	 less	 than	100	000	clock	cycles	 to	run.	An	 image	showing	 this	 is	Figure	39.	Here,	 if	 the	program	took	 longer	 than	or	equal	 to	100	000	clock	cycles,	 it	would	be	set	 to	100	000.	 If	 it	 takes	 less,	 than	the	window	size	will	be	limited	to	the	time	it	took	to	perform	all	operations.	As	it	can	be	seen	in	the	figure,	only	9	algorithms	exceed	100	000	clock	cycles,	and	2	of	them	only	in	some	special	cases.	The	rest	are	much	smaller.	
	
Figure	39:	Window	sizes	smaller	than	100	000	Due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	measurements	 are	 on	 different	 time	 periods,	 it	 is	impossible	to	get	a	realistic	scenario	and	the	results	would	probably	end	up	being	very	good.	As	a	matter	of	 fact,	a	decision	 tree	on	 this	data	with	no	pre-processing	achieves	99.65%	accuracy	with	the	corresponding	confusion	matrix	shown	in	Figure	40.	 Certainly,	 the	 difference	 in	 window	 sizes	 will	 correspond	 to	 difference	 in	number	of	cache	hits	and	misses.	However,	there	is	still	some	significant	insight	that	can	be	taken	from	this	data.		mm,	 binarySearch,	 simonEncrypt,	 AESOpenSSLEncrypt,	 RSAEncrypt,	 and	RSADecrypt	 all	 take	 longer	 than	 100	 000	 cc.	 For	 most	 of	 them,	 except	 for	 RSA	Encryption	and	Decryption,	 the	accuracy	 is	much	above	99%.	For	RSA	operations,	the	 accuracy	 is	 around	 98%,	 which	 is	 still	 significantly	 higher	 than	 anything	obtained	before.	This	data	definitely	 shows	 that	measuring	 longer	periods	of	 time	leads	 to	 better	 results.	 However,	 this	 is	 a	 tough	 problem	 for	 crypto,	 especially	lightweight	crypto,	because	algorithms	tend	to	be	small.	
	
Figure	40:	Confusion	matrix	for	Decision	Tree	on	100	000	cc			
Most	Realistic	Scenario	In	real	life,	it	is	very	hard	to	measure	as	much	information	about	a	cache	as	Gem5	 is	giving.	Therefore,	 I	decided	 to	 investigate	how	good	are	 the	results	when	only	 one	 part	 of	 the	 cache	 can	 be	 measured.	 First	 I	 run	 the	 algorithms	 on	 the	window	size	of	10	000	clock	cycles	after	which	 I	 run	 it	on	 the	100	000	 just	 to	get	more	insight	about	more	information	for	heavier	ciphers.	
Remember	that	in	feature	selection	so	far	the	following	pieces	of	information	were	the	most	relevant	ones:	dcacheReadHits,	dcacheWriteHits,	dcacheWriteMisses,	icacheHitAverage,	dcacheHitAverage.	I	analyze	the	data	with	decision	trees	on	each	of	the	parameters	independently	and	see	how	each	of	them	behaves.		 On	 a	 10	 000	 clock	 cycles	window,	 Decision	 Trees	 on	 dcacheReadHits	 have	53.26%.	The	corresponding	confusion	matrix	can	be	seen	in	Figure	41.		Although	the	overall	results	are	not	much	better	than	a	coin	flip,	it	is	clear	that	some	algorithms	are	 fairly	 well	 distinguished.	 Matrix	 Multiplication,	 Binary	 Search	 &	 Merge	 Sort,	Simon,	 RSA	 Encrypt	 and	 Decrypt	 score	 close	 to	 or	 even	 over	 70%	 accuracy.	However,	smaller	algorithms	such	as	SHA	hashing	and	MD5	hashing,	AES	and	DES	are	very	poorly	classified.	
	
Figure	41:	dcacheReadHits	confusion	matrix	on	10	000	cc		Decision	 Trees	 on	 icacheHitAverage	 have	 52.82%	 accuracy,	 fairly	 close	 to	dcacheReadHits.	The	 results	 from	 icacheHitAverage	are	 surprisingly	 similar	 to	 the	results	from	dcacheReadHits.	The	same	types	of	algorithms	are	easier	to	identify.		
	
Figure	42:	icacheReadHits	feature	on	10	000	cc			 Performing	Decision	Trees	on	dcacheWriteHits	also	obtains	a	result	close	to	50%,	more	precisely,	50.6%.	The	confusion	matrix	from	Figure	43	shows	that	the	measurements	are	noisier,	but	some	algorithms	can	somehow	easier	be	identified.	So	far	it	can	be	seen	that	identifying	non-crypto	related	algorithms	from	crypto	related	algorithms.	RSA	and	other	complex	algorithms	are	easier	to	identify	than	
other	crypto	algorithms.	However,	different	implementations	of	AES	seem	to	be	very	hard	to	distinguish	and	the	same	can	be	said	about	hashing	functions.		
	
Figure	43:	dcacheWriteHits	feature	on	10	000	cc	Decision	Trees	on	averages	behave	similarly	to	how	they	behave	on	the	other	attributes.	 icacheHitAverage	obtains	52.8%	accuracy	and	dcacheHitAverage	scores	49.7%	 accuracy.	 The	 confusion	 matrices	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 Figure	 44	 and	 Figure	45.these	results	obey	the	patterns	found	in	the	previous	three	attributes	measured.	The	confusion	matrix	can	be	seen	in	Figure	44.		
	
Figure	44:	icacheHitAverage	feature	on	10	000	cc	
	
Figure	45:	dcacheHitAverage	feature	on	10	000	cc	dcacheWriteMisses	perform	worst.	A	decision	tree	on	this	data	obtains	24%	accuracy.	The	tree	obtained	has	only	21	leaves,	reason	why	there	is	just	not	enough	
information	to	distinguish	among	programs.	The	corresponding	confusion	matrix	is	shown	in	Figure	46	and	a	picture	of	the	distribution	is	shown	in	Figure	47.		
	
Figure	46:	dcacheWriteMisses	feature	on	10	000	cc	
	
Figure	47:	dcacheWriteMisses	distribution	10	000	cc		On	a	10	000	clock	 cycles	window,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 some	programs	are	much	easier	to	identify	than	others.	It	seems	that	all	three	algorithms	that	are	not	part	of	crypto	libraries	are	generally	well	classified.	Also,	in	most	of	the	attributes,	both	RSA	have	 scored	 well,	 while	 AES	 and	 DES	 most	 of	 the	 times	 scored	 above	 average.	However,	 the	 hash	 functions	 perform	worst	 (in	 absolutely	 all	 cases	 they	 perform	under	40%).			On	a	100	000	clock	cycles	window	it	 is	very	hard	to	get	reliable	accuracies.	Measuring	only	dcacheReadHits,	Decision	Trees	obtain	91.7%	accuracy.	Obviously,	some	of	the	algorithms	that	finish	in	less	than	100	000	cycles	can	score	even	100%.	The	confusion	matrix	is	presented	in	Figure	48.	Within	this	not	realistic	information,	we	can	still	see	that	long	algorithms	(that	take	longer	than	100	000	cc	to	finish)	like	mm,	binarySearch,	RSAEncrypt	 and	Decrypt,	 and	AESOpenSSLEncrypt	 have	better	accuracies	than	80%.	This	definitely	shows	how	powerful	more	measurements	are	and	how	many	crypto	algorithms	are	just	too	small	to	really	offer	good	results.	
	
Figure	48:	Confusion	Matrix	of	dcacheReadHits	100	000	cc	Due	to	the	non-realistic	scenario	of	classifying	number	of	hits	or	misses	since	they	 differ	 just	 because	 the	 window	 sizes	 end	 up	 being	 different	 for	 smaller	algorithms,	 I	 decided	 to	 run	 Decision	 Trees	 on	 the	 average	 measures.	 Average	measures	normalize	the	results	per	clock	cycle	and	that	should	limit	the	information	gained	 from	 running	 a	 cipher	 longer	 than	 others.	 Decision	 Trees	 obtain	 86.8%	accuracy	on	dcacheHitAverage,	94.5%	accuracy	on	icacheHitAverage.	The	confusion	matrices	 are	 shown	 in	 Figure	 49	 and	 Figure	 50.	 They	 both	 classify	 almost	 all	algorithms	 very	 well,	 except	 for	 dcacheHitAverage	 that	 does	 not	 classify	 RSA	algorithms	well.	This	result	 is	surprising	 for	dcache	because	 in	 the	previous	set	of	measurements,	RSA	was	one	of	the	consistently	well	classified.			
	
Figure	49:	Confusion	Matrix	dcacheHitAverage	100	000	cc	
	
Figure	50:	Confusion	Matrix	icacheHitAverage	100	000	cc	Even	for	a	big	window	size	average	misses	on	both	icache	and	dcache	score	only	 around	 57%.	 Although	 a	 great	 improvement	 from	 24%	 with	 a	 smaller	measurements,	cache	misses	still	seem	not	to	be	a	good	attribute	for	classification.	
The	 confusion	 matrices	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 Figure	 51	 and	 Figure	 52.	 They	 behave	similarly	 to	 the	 previous	 set	 of	 measurements	 where	 there	 is	 just	 not	 enough	information	 to	 construct	 a	 proper	 tree	 and	 data	 ends	 up	 being	 classified	 as	 only	some	of	the	attributes.		
	
Figure	51:	Confusion	Matrix	dcacheMissAverage	100	000	cc	
	
Figure	52:	Confusion	Matrix	icacheHitAverage	100	000	cc	From	these	measurements	 it	 looks	as	 icache	 is	better	 to	be	monitored	than	dcache.	Also,	 it	 seems	 that	measuring	hits	 instead	of	writes	provides	much	better	results	since	misses	do	not	occur	often	enough	to	provide	useful	 information.	This	data	is	also	consistent	with	the	non-realistic	scenario	in	the	conclusion	that	longer	monitoring	of	the	cache	obtains	a	much	higher	accuracy.	Another	important	pattern	that	 can	 be	 seen	 from	 this	 data	 is	 the	 fact	 that	more	measurements	 obtain	much	better	results.		If	a	realistic	scenario	is	to	be	constructed,	this	work	suggests	that	measuring	hits	on	an	icache	for	a	long	period	of	time	would	be	the	best	approach.	 	
4.	Conclusion	On	the	one	hand,	this	work	presents	the	most	area-efficient	SIMON	core	that	is	resistant	to	first-order	side-channel	attacks.	This	also	makes	the	crypto	engine	the	smallest	engine	secure	against	first	order	side-channel	attacks	with	an	improvement	of	 almost	 15%	 compared	 to	 the	 previous	 smallest	 implementation.	 The	 cipher	 is	built	on	t-private	circuits,	which	allowed	going	down	to	only	two	shares.	Moreover,	this	work	shows	that	 first-order	side	channel	resistance	can	be	achieved	with	 two	shares.	The	side-channel	resistance	of	this	engine	is	validated	by	performing	leakage	quantification	tests	such	as	the	Fixed	vs.	Random	t-test.		On	 the	other	hand,	 this	work	 shows	 that	 in	a	 simulated	environment,	 side-channel	 leakage	 from	 caches	 can	 be	 extremely	 powerful.	 With	 enough	measurements,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	most	 of	 the	 codes	 can	 be	 correctly	 classified	 in	 all	three	categories	of	distinction	investigated	in	this	paper,	 i.e.	crypto	algorithms	can	very	well	 be	distinguished	 from	non-crypto	 algorithms,	 different	 implementations	of	 the	 same	 algorithm	 can	 be	 also	 be	 distinguished,	 and	 with	 a	 slightly	 smaller	accuracy,	similar	algorithms	within	the	same	crypto	library	can	be	identified	as	well.	An	 important	 insight	 obtained	 during	 this	 experiment	 is	 the	 weaknesses	 of	identifying	encryption	from	decryption	and	vice	versa	for	the	same	algorithm.	That	shows	a	 smaller	 cache	 leakage	when	same	operations	are	performed,	even	 if	 they	are	 in	 a	 slightly	 different	 order.	 This	 issue	 can	 also	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 difficulty	 in	identifying	 RSA	 Sign	 and	 Verify	 from	 RSA	 Encrypt	 and	 Decrypt	 because	 they	correspond	 to	 the	 same	 operations.	 Another	 important	 insight	 in	 program	recognition	is	the	relevance	of	the	time	length	for	the	measurements.	Clearly	 from	our	 results,	 measuring	 over	 a	 longer	 period	 of	 time	 significantly	 improves	 the	quality	of	the	classification.	One	weakness	of	this	characteristic	is	the	fact	that	some	algorithms	 in	 real	 life	 run	 for	 short	 periods	 of	 time.	 Finally	 the	 most	 important	result	of	these	experiments	is	the	accuracy	of	the	most	realistic	scenario.	Although	measurements	are	much	noisier	 than	 in	 real	 life,	 the	data	obtained	 in	 this	project	suggests	that	creating	a	tool	that	operates	on	real	cache	measurements	at	runtime	could	be	feasible.				 	
5.	Future	Work		 	Although	 both	 projects	 obtain	 reasonable	 results,	 there	 is	 still	 room	 for	improvement	in	both	of	them.	The	SIMON	core	presented	in	this	paper	is	the	most	area-efficient	 core	 resistant	 to	 first-order	 SCA.	 However,	 the	 t-private	implementation	requires	an	extra	source	of	randomness	that	adds	more	complexity	than	 it	 is	 really	needed	 for	 two	shares.	Threshold	 implementations	on	 two	shares	where	operations	are	pipelined	could	be	more	area	efficient.		 In	 program	 recognition,	 there	 is	 more	 work	 to	 be	 done	 in	 pursuing	 the	realistic	scenario	and	expanding	 to	more	platforms.	 It	 is	clear	 that	 for	a	simulated	environment,	 the	 results	 are	 very	 accurate.	 One	 step	 would	 be	 to	 apply	 a	 cache	model	on	top	of	the	iCache	hit	data	obtained	from	Gem5	so	that	all	the	data	used	for	training	and	testing	would	be	coming	from	only	one	cache	line.	Since	cache	lines	can	be	measured	from	outside	the	system,	good	behavior	over	simulated	data	is	likely	to	translate	 into	a	powerful	 tool	 in	 the	 real	world.	Moreover,	 in	 this	project	only	 the	ARM	 platform	 was	 investigated	 while	 in	 reality	 there	 are	 many	 hardware	architectures.	 In	 order	 for	 this	 work	 to	 be	 complete,	 the	 same	 steps	 should	 be	applied	to	different	platforms	and	 investigate	which	ones	are	 the	most	secure	and	where	is	it	important	to	pay	more	attention	to	security		
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